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Nondelegation originalism is having its moment. Recent Supreme Court
opinions suggest that a majority of Justices may be prepared to impose strict
constitutional limits on Congress’s power to delegate policymaking authority to the
executive branch. In response, scholars have scoured the historical record for evidence
affirming or refuting a more stringent version of nondelegation than current Supreme
Court doctrine demands. Though the debate ranges widely, sharp disputes have arisen
over whether a series of apparently broad Founding-era delegations defeat originalist
arguments in favor of a more demanding modern doctrine. Proponents—whom I call
“nondelegationists”—argue that these historical delegations can all be explained as
exceptions to an otherwise-strict constitutional limit.
As this Article shows, it is highly doubtful that the Founding generation thought
of delegation in such categorical terms. The evidence nondelegationists cite in favor of
their preferred classifications—systematically assessed here for the first time—is
remarkably thin. More importantly, this Article highlights how, for the Founding
generation, building the administrative capacity needed to fulfill the national
government’s responsibilities was not a quest to trace out hard constitutional
boundaries between the branches. It was a dynamic and improvisational experiment
in governance, in which Congress sought to mobilize its limited resources to meet the
myriad challenges the new nation faced.
To recapture early delegation’s dynamism, this Article focuses on the Remission
Act of 1790. It gave the Secretary of the Treasury broad and unreviewable authority
to remit statutory penalties for violations of federal law governing maritime
commerce—power a strict nondelegation principle would not have allowed. This
arrangement was not the obvious choice, and Congress considered vesting this power
in a range of institutional actors before settling on the Secretary. Yet despite deep
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concerns over the wisdom—and even the constitutionality—of concentrating too much
power in the hands of a single executive branch officer, Congress repeatedly affirmed
this discretion, and the early Secretaries (including Alexander Hamilton) did not
hesitate to use it.
This was a pattern Congress repeated elsewhere, making early delegations of
varying breadth across the spectrum of federal administration. This experiment in
governance was not easy, nor was it free from controversy. Disputes over how and
where to allocate governmental authority were frequent and contentious. But if
legislative debates occasionally sounded in a constitutional register, overwhelmingly
they turned on the kinds of practical considerations that animated Congress’s
deliberations over the Remission Act. When it came to designing a workable
administrative system for the new federal government, delegation’s boundaries were
apparently quite expansive.
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Nondelegation originalism is having its moment. For most of the
past century, the Supreme Court has refused to impose any meaningful
constitutional limit on Congress’s ability to delegate rulemaking
authority to the executive branch. Yet recent Court opinions suggest
that five Justices might be ready to adopt a more stringent view of the
nondelegation doctrine, on originalist grounds. Most notably, in
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Gundy v. United States, 1 Justice Gorsuch argued in dissent that the
Court’s longstanding approach to nondelegation—which requires
only that Congress provide the executive with an “intelligible
principle” to guide administrative rulemaking 2—“has no basis in the
original meaning of the Constitution.” 3 According to Gorsuch, “the
framers” believed that Congress cannot delegate to the executive
branch “the power to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct
governing future actions by private persons.”4 Given the apparent
agreement of four other Justices, 5 Gorsuch’s opinion raises the
possibility that the Court is prepared to impose significant limits on
Congress’s ability to delegate authority to administrative agencies. The
full implications of such a decision are far from clear,6 but a
reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine could have a significant impact
on how the modern administrative state functions.7
In light of the stakes, skeptics and supporters of the modern
administrative state have recently explored in detail what people in the
Founding era thought about Congress’s power to delegate legislative
authority to the executive. 8 The scholarly debate ranges broadly over
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1 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
2 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
3 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 2133.
5 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined Justice Gorsuch’s dissent. Id. at
2131. In the same case, Justice Alito said he would be “willing to reconsider” the permissive
approach mandated by the Court’s precedent. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Kavanaugh has since suggested that Justice Gorsuch’s “thoughtful” opinion in Gundy
merited “further consideration.” Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh,
J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari).
6 See Andrew Coan, Eight Futures of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 141,
147 (discussing “six possible scenarios” for the Court’s future nondelegation
jurisprudence).
7 See Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 287 (2021) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine may soon become a
genuine limit on Congress’s power to enlist agencies in the task of governance.”); Nicholas
R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power:
New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288, 1296
(2021) (“[R]ulemaking is so ubiquitous that mere doubt about its constitutionality could
work major changes in the nondelegation doctrine and administrative law more
generally.”).
8 See Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at the Founding, GA. L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3654564 [https://
perma.cc/XSU4-D4EQ]; Aaron Gordon, Note, Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 718
(2019); Philip Hamburger, Delegating or Divesting?, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2020),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr_online/293
[https://perma.cc
/L2DU-E4MA]; Gary Lawson, Mr. Gorsuch, Meet Mr. Marshall: A Private-Law Framework for
the Public-Law Puzzle of Subdelegation, AM. ENTER. INST. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3607159 [https://perma.cc/SC2D-6KMJ]; Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7;
Parrillo, supra note 7; Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 1490 (2021).
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a variety of pre-Ratification European and American sources, 9 but
some of the sharpest disputes have arisen over the conclusions one can
draw from early federal legislation. 10 For good reason: throughout the
1790s (and well into the nineteenth century), Congress passed laws
giving the executive branch significant policymaking discretion in a
variety of domains—patents, foreign trade, military pensions, land
taxation, and the postal system, to name a few.11 This early legislative
output is the best evidence we have of Founding-era views of
delegation’s constitutionality, as the other traditional sources of the
Constitution’s original meaning—text, structure, and pre-Ratification
sources—are largely inconclusive. 12
Modern scholars disagree deeply about the conclusions we can
draw from Congress’s early grants of legislative authority to the
executive branch. Delegation’s supporters view the Founding-era
statutes as powerful evidence that the Constitution originally imposed
a weak limit on Congress’s power to delegate—and perhaps no limit at
all. 13 In response, proponents of a more demanding modern
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In this Article, I use the term “Founding generation” as shorthand to refer to the
people who designed the federal government and put it into motion in the years
immediately following the Constitution’s ratification. Of course, the people whose views I
characterize in this Article as representing the “Founding generation” are not
representative at all. They are all white men from the nation’s political and economic elite.
Women, the poor, racial minorities, and other disenfranchised persons had their own ideas
about the content of American constitutionalism. In many cases, those views differed from
those held by the kind of people I cite here. See, e.g., Farah Peterson, Constitutionalism in
Unexpected Places, 106 VA. L. REV. 559 (2020). They likely had views on the degree to which
Congress should or could delegate legislative authority to the executive branch. Attempting
to reconstruct those views would be a worthy endeavor, see id. at 608 (critiquing historical
research that “restrict[s] one’s focus to official texts, the published letters of great men,
legal opinions, and the like”), but would involve a level of historical research that is beyond
the scope of this Article.
9 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014);
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7; Wurman, supra note 8, at 1518–50.
10 See, e.g., Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 332–66; Wurman, supra note 8, at
1503–14, 1550–56; see generally Parrillo, supra note 7, at 1298 n.40 (citing sources).
11 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 332–66.
12 See Parrillo, supra note 7, at 1299–1300 (“[S]ources bearing on original meaning
besides early congressional acts—constitutional text, preratification discourse, and
structure—say very little about constitutional limits on delegation.”).
13 See Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript at 3) (“[T]he theory and practice of
delegation in the Founding era never reflected a particularly high constitutional bar.”);
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 332 (“[T]he Founders’ practice reflected [their
theory] . . . : [r]egulatory delegations were limited only by the will and judgment of the
legislature.”); Parrillo, supra note 7, at 1313 (“Vesting power in administrators to make
sweeping discretionary decisions with high political stakes was not alien to the federal
lawmakers who first put the Constitution into practice.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1735 (2002)
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doctrine—whom I call “nondelegationists”—have advanced a variety
of overlapping theories to explain and justify this early legislation. 14
They argue that, despite the Constitution’s general prohibition on
delegation, certain types were originally understood to be permissible:
delegations of “nonexclusive” legislative authority shared by the
executive, 15 delegations regarding “foreign affairs” 16 or public
“benefits,” 17 delegations of authority to “fill up the details” on matters
of lesser importance,18 and delegations made out of “necessity.” 19
The historical accuracy of these “exceptional” categories of
delegation is deeply important, yet largely unexplored in the current
scholarship. 20
Without such exceptions, it is difficult—if not
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(“[C]onsistent early practice . . . decisively established the permissibility of statutory grants
to the president unchecked by any apparent intelligible principle.”).
14 See Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern
Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 147, 157 (2017) (“Outside the realm of
foreign affairs . . . [Congress] did not authorize the President . . . to adopt rules that broadly
regulated behavior of private individuals or entities . . . .”); Gordon, supra note 8, at 750
(asserting that “a few exceptions” to early nondelegation practice “do not reflect a view
among the framing generation that no such prohibition existed”); Gary Lawson, Delegation
and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398–402 (2002) (arguing that six early examples
did not “clearly vest legislative power in executive or judicial actors”); Wurman, supra note
8, at 1497 (“Most of this legislation . . . from early Congresses is consistent with modern
scholarly accounts of nondelegation.”). All the scholars I describe as “nondelegationists”
argue that an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation mandates a more
demanding version of the nondelegation doctrine than the Supreme Court’s “intelligible
principle” test. They differ widely, however, in terms of the originalist theory they espouse
and the test(s) they believe should replace current doctrine. I include Philip Hamburger
in this group, even though he does not identify as an originalist, because his argument rests
heavily on the notion that a more stringent nondelegation principle inhered in the
Founding-era Constitution. See HAMBURGER, supra note 9.
15 See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1533–36.
16 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
Cass, supra note 14, at 157–58; Gordon, supra note 8, at 782–83.
17 See HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 3 n.b, 86–87; Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and
Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133
HARV. L. REV. 164, 178–82 (2019).
18 See Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1502, 1516–17.
19 See Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript at 35–37); cf. Chabot, supra note 8
(manuscript at 41–44) (suggesting a “necessity” theory might best explain early
delegations).
20 In their recent article, Julian Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley generally deny that
such exceptions existed at the Founding, but do not directly address the arguments put
forth by nondelegationists. See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 279–80, 367. In an
unpublished supplement to his recent article, Nicholas Parrillo suggests that two
exceptions—foreign affairs and privileges/benefits—may be “untenable,” but he does not
evaluate all the evidence cited by nondelegationists, and ultimately assumes the exceptions’
validity for purposes of argument. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Supplemental Paper to: “A
Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New
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Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s” 16–20 (May 14, 2021)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3696902 [https://perma.cc/2U7Y-P4WN]. A recent note explores several early delegations
specifically in the realm of foreign affairs, and concludes that “[n]o one suggested the[y]
were permissible solely by virtue of their foreign affairs subject matter.” Note,
Nondelegation’s Unprincipled Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1132, 1140
(2021).
21 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 367; Parrillo, supra note 7, at 1297–98.
22 In this Article, I take no position on whether an originalist approach to interpreting
the Constitution is the right one. I simply take it is a given that any Supreme Court revision
of the nondelegation doctrine will be premised in significant part on originalist analysis.
23 See infra Section III.B.
24 See infra Part IV.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 129 Side B

impossible—for nondelegationists to reconcile a number of early
congressional delegations with a stringent original understanding of
nondelegation principles. 21 Whether the justifications are based on
foreign affairs, benefits, lack of importance, or some other category,
they are essential to the nondelegationist effort to explain the early
Congress’s apparent willingness to give significant policymaking
discretion to the executive branch.
As this Article shows, it is highly doubtful that the Founding
generation thought of delegation and its limits in such categorical
terms. 22 This Article offers the first systematic assessment of the
historical evidence nondelegationists cite in favor of their preferred
taxonomies, and finds it remarkably thin. 23 Simply put, no one at the
Founding did more than hint at the existence of particular categories
of permissible delegations. If that is correct, then the better explanation for why the early Congress routinely delegated legislative power to
the executive branch is that no one thought the Constitution
prohibited it from doing so.
The nondelegationists’ search for a more restrictive original
doctrine also poses a deeper problem: it loses sight of the highly
uncertain and improvisational nature of early American state-building.
As this Article illustrates, for members of the early Congress, building
the administrative capacity needed to fulfill the new national
government’s critical responsibilities was not a quest to trace out hard
constitutional boundaries between the branches. 24 It was a dynamic,
improvisational, and only partially successful experiment in
governance, in which Congress sought to mobilize the limited
resources available to it in order to meet the myriad challenges the
nation faced. Whatever abstract limits the Constitution might have
imposed on Congress’s ability to allocate policymaking authority across
the institutions of the nascent federal government, they had little
apparent impact when it came to actually legislating.
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This Article seeks to recapture the dynamism of early
congressional delegation through the lens of the Remission Act of
1790. 25 The Act was the First Congress’s most intriguing grant of
legislative authority to the executive branch, yet is has largely been
overlooked in the nondelegation literature. 26 In it, Congress gave the
Secretary of the Treasury a power to “regulat[e] private conduct” that
modern nondelegationists would likely deem constitutionally
impermissible. 27 Under the Act, Congress delegated to the Secretary
the legislature’s authority to modify or waive the statutory penalties
imposed on individuals for violations of major federal laws governing
customs collection and maritime commerce. 28 As long as the Secretary
believed that the lawbreaker had acted without “intention of fraud,”
he could impose as much or as little of the attendant fine or forfeiture
as he “deem[ed] reasonable and just.” 29 There was no appeal from
the Secretary’s decision—not to the courts, not to the President, and
not to Congress. 30 In short, shortly after the Constitution was ratified,
Congress did what Justice Gorsuch (and others) believe is
constitutionally forbidden: it delegated to the executive branch
Congress’s own authority to determine what financial punishments the
government would impose on private individuals for violations of the
law. 31
Agreement on how best to structure such a significant grant of
authority did not come easily. Remission of penalties was a legislative
power exercised by Congress in the first instance. 32 But at Alexander
Hamilton’s suggestion, Congress resolved to delegate that power
elsewhere. Members had deep concerns over the wisdom of
concentrating too much power in the hands of a single person, and
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25 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 122.
26 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 793 (three sentences); Lawson, supra note 14, at 401
(two paragraphs); Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 347 (three sentences); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 13, at 1735 (one sentence); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1553–54 n.348
(one paragraph). This scholarly inattention is understandable. Congress established the
Act in a one-paragraph statute, Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122–23, and the
early Supreme Court only discussed it once. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 246, 291 (1825). As a result, the importance of the early Treasury Secretaries’
remission authority only becomes apparent through archival research into how they actually
used the power, something I have done in prior work. See Kevin Arlyck, The Founders’
Forfeiture, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1482–98 (2019).
27 Cf. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
28 See Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1482–98.
29 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122–23.
30 Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1485 & n.215.
31 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[I]t’s hard to see how giving
the nation’s chief prosecutor the power to write a criminal code rife with his own policy
choices might be [constitutionally] permissible.”); see also infra Section II.D.
32 See infra Section II.B.
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33 See infra Section II.B.
34 See infra Section II.C.
35 See infra Section IV.A.
36 See infra Section IV.B.
37 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising Among
Empires, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 209, 213 (2008).
38 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 282 (“[C]reative lawyers did very
occasionally express their opposition to proposed legislation in constitutional terms.”).
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the legislature considered vesting it in a shifting array of institutional
actors—local federal officials, district court judges, a panel of cabinet
officers, and even the Justices of the Supreme Court—before settling
on the Treasury Secretary. 33 Reluctant to commit to this arrangement,
Congress repeatedly reauthorized the Act on a temporary basis, and it
was subject to renewed challenge—including on nondelegation
grounds—before finally becoming permanent in 1800. 34
As contested as the Act was, members of Congress did not think
that the Constitution had much to say about it. To the contrary, they
largely debated the Act on the basis of nonconstitutional values—
efficiency, consistency, expertise, neutrality, and capacity—which
often cut in different directions. They argued over how best to balance
the government’s law enforcement priorities against the obligation to
treat citizens with justice. In so doing, they apparently felt free to
experiment with various institutional arrangements, to come up with
solutions to the challenges of national governance that best balanced
the competing considerations at play.35
As this Article explains, this was a pattern Congress repeated in
other areas, making delegations of varying breadth to a range of
government officials, across the spectrum of federal administration. In
areas as diverse as revenue collection, disaster relief, and military
development (among others), Founding-generation Americans
displayed tremendous creativity in building a federal government that
would be limited in its objects but vigorous in pursuing them. 36
This “extended improvisation” in governance was not easy, nor
was it free from controversy. 37 Disputes over how and where to allocate
governmental authority were frequent and contentious. And debaters
occasionally advanced nondelegation arguments, rendering it at least
plausible that Founding-era constitutional understandings included
some theoretical limit on Congress’s ability to delegate its authority to
the executive branch. 38 But whatever nondelegation principles such
interlocutors may have had in mind, there is little evidence that they
imposed anything more than a weak constraint on Congress’s
discretion. When it came to the nitty-gritty of designing a workable
administrative system for the new federal government, delegation’s
boundaries were expansive indeed.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the current debate
over whether the modern, permissive nondelegation doctrine is
consistent with an originalist interpretation of the Constitution. The
Part focuses particular attention on the various ways in which
nondelegationist scholars have sought to reconcile the best evidence
of the Constitution’s original meaning—early federal statutes—with a
stringent view of constitutional limits on delegation.
Part II describes the Remission Act’s origins, revealing the
challenge Congress faced in designing a system for remitting statutory
penalties that would balance protection of federal revenue against
lenity for unintentional lawbreakers. In light of deep concerns about
the wisdom of concentrating legislative power in a single executivebranch official, Congress considered a number of different options
before ultimately conferring broad and unreviewable authority on the
Treasury Secretary. Despite ongoing objections to this arrangement,
Congress repeatedly reauthorized the Act throughout the 1790s, and
the early Treasury Secretaries—including Alexander Hamilton—did
not hesitate to use their power to waive statutory penalties set by
Congress.
In light of this history, Part III uses the Remission Act as a vehicle
for assessing the various theories advanced by nondelegationists to
reconcile early legislation with a stringent version of the doctrine. The
Part first concludes that the Act itself cannot be explained satisfactorily
by any of the theories. Even if remission might resemble an exercise
of traditional executive authority (such as prosecutorial discretion or
pardon), or can be seen as relating to foreign affairs or the provision
of public benefits, the Act does not fit easily into any proposed
exceptional category.
In so doing, Part III also answers a more important question: Did
these “exceptions” to a stringent nondelegation principle really exist?
By carefully considering the limited evidence cited by proponents, and
the significant evidence against, Part III concludes that they almost
certainly did not. As a result, there are a number of early delegations
by Congress, in addition to the Remission Act, that can only be
explained by the conclusion that there was not much of a limit on
delegation at the Founding at all.
Part IV steps back, to consider how and why the early Congresses
granted the remission power to the Treasury Secretary in the first
place. In struggling to design an administrative system for commercial
regulation and revenue collection, Congress considered a variety of
arrangements that might strike the right balance between different
administrative values. Delegation to the Treasury Secretary was not the
obvious choice—it was simply the best one Congress could come up
with. As this Part shows, the same was true with respect to other
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delegations that have figured prominently in the nondelegation
scholarship. In other words, across the domains of federal administration, strict constitutional limits on what powers and responsibilities the
legislature could delegate to another branch were not what shaped the
early regime.
I.

THE NONDELEGATION DEBATE

For nearly all of its history in the Supreme Court, nondelegation
has done little to limit Congress’s ability to delegate legislative
authority to the executive branch.39 The Court has only ruled three
times that a statute was an unconstitutional delegation, all in the New
Deal era. 40 The Court’s long-established test for delegation requires
only that Congress provide the executive branch with an “intelligible
principle” to guide administrative rulemaking,41 and it has repeatedly
upheld very broad delegations in the face of constitutional challenge. 42
Given this history, more than one commentator has declared the
nondelegation doctrine to be a dead letter.43
Recently, nondelegation has experienced a revival. Building on a
strand of legal scholarship insisting that the Supreme Court’s
“intelligible principle” test is incompatible with Founding-era views
about the delegation of legislative authority, 44 a majority of the current
Court may be prepared to adopt a more stringent version of the
doctrine. Without a doubt, the view recently articulated by Justice
Gorsuch in Gundy would represent a significant change in approach.
According to Justice Gorsuch, Congress cannot give the President or
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39 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“We
might say that the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and
counting).”).
40 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935);
Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
311 (1936).
41 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality opinion).
42 See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (“public
interest, convenience, or necessity” (quoting Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
§§ 309(a), 312(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1085, 1087 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 309(a), 312(b) (2018)))); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472
(2001) (“requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000)).
43 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
132–33 (1980); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 1722.
44 See HAMBURGER, supra note 9; Cass, supra note 14; Gordon, supra note 8; Lawson,
supra note 14; Joseph Postell & Paul D. Moreno, Not Dead Yet—or Never Born? The Reality of
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONST. STUD. 41 (2018); Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective
Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and
Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265 (2001); Wurman, supra
note 8.
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an agency the discretion to “adopt generally applicable rules of
conduct governing future actions by private persons” 45—which it has
done in countless statutes, including several upheld by the Court in
the past. 46 As a number of commentators have noted, the Supreme
Court’s adoption of this test would call into question the
constitutionality of major delegations of legislative authority.47 Even
assuming the Court would hesitate before striking down important
federal legislation on nondelegation grounds, 48 a more demanding
doctrine could have significant repercussions for the administrative
state more generally. 49
Justice Gorsuch justified his test based on what he understands to
be the Constitution’s “original meaning” 50 and the “guiding
principles” left to us by “the framers.” 51 Yet the historical evidence he
cited in Gundy does little to support his proposed version of
nondelegation. His opinion includes several references to the
Federalist, a quotation from John Locke, and citation to three early
nineteenth-century cases. 52
Justice Thomas’s 2015 opinion in
Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads relies more
heavily on citations to prerevolutionary English precedent (stretching
back to Magna Carta), and a sprinkling of Founding-era sources
(mostly from the Federalist). 53 At best, these materials suggest that a
prohibition on delegations of legislative power to the executive is
consistent with separation of powers principles more generally.54
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45 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The rules articulated by Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch are not identical, but they are substantively similar. Dep’t of Transp.
v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 70 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that Congress cannot delegate authority to “formulate generally applicable rules of
private conduct”).
46 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1989) (citing examples).
47 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (asserting that if SORNA is
unconstitutional, “then most of Government is unconstitutional”); Mortenson & Bagley,
supra note 7, at 287–88.
48 See Coan, supra note 6, at 142 (“A sweeping revolution in U.S. constitutional law is
unlikely to be imminent.”).
49 See Bamzai, supra note 17, at 169 (suggesting that, following Gundy, the Court may
read delegating statutes more narrowly to avoid a constitutional difficulty).
50 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 2135–36.
52 Id. at 2133–34.
53 575 U.S. 43, 69–76 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
54 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]here can be no liberty
where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 302 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961))).
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None of these sources articulate anything like the test the Justices
purport to derive from the historical record.55
In Gundy, Justice Gorsuch also cited a handful of scholars who
argue that the Court’s twentieth-century nondelegation doctrine is
incompatible with Founding-era views. 56 In Gundy’s wake, these
skeptics have been joined by several more. 57 In response, several
defenders of the modern doctrine have engaged in their own deep
investigations into Founding-era sources. 58 The collective result is a far
richer exploration of the historical evidence than found in recent
Supreme Court opinions.
The challenge is that the usual sources of originalist evidence are
largely unhelpful in identifying nondelegation’s precise contours.59 As
conceded on all sides, the constitutional text itself tells us virtually
nothing. 60 Article I says that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” but does not say
anything about whether Congress can delegate those powers to
nonlegislative actors. 61 Arguments from constitutional structure do
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55 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 289 (“[T]he only actual quotes from
historical sources [in Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy opinion] either speak generally to the
undesirability of vesting all constitutional powers in one body or recite the familiar reasons
that the Constitution makes legislating hard.” (citing Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133–35, 2144)).
56 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135–40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Cass, supra
note 14, at 153; HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 378; Lawson, supra note 14, at 340)
57 See supra notes 8, 14 and accompanying text.
58 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
59 Nicholas Parrillo cogently makes this argument in a recent unpublished paper. See
Parrillo, supra note 20 (manuscript at 3–13).
60 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2127 (2004) (“The text of the Constitution
is . . . silent on the question whether or to what extent legislative power may be shared.”);
Lawson, supra note 14, at 335 (“[T]here is nothing in the Constitution that specifically
states, in precise terms, that no other actor may exercise legislative power or that Congress
may not authorize other actors to exercise legislative power.”).
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Even if a limit on delegation could be implied, cf.
Hamburger, supra note 8, at 90 (“The Constitution vests legislative powers in Congress, and
that body therefore cannot . . . divest itself of[] the powers that the Constitution vests in
it.”), the text offers no indication of what delegations that limit might permit or prohibit.
See Parrillo, supra note 20 (manuscript at 4 n.7). Because one cannot derive a rule against
nondelegation from the constitutional text itself, some originalists would likely take the
position that the task of formulating such a rule would require “construction” rather than
“interpretation” of the text. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the
Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2018) (discussing the
“interpretation and construction” distinction); Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010) (same). But see JOHN O.
MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 142–43
(2013) (viewing resort to “construction” and other “sources of law extrinsic to the
Constitution” as being inconsistent with originalism). No nondelegationist describes their
effort to derive constitutional principle from historical discourse and practice as an exercise
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not get us much further. A stringent view of nondelegation might
generally be consistent with a tripartite division of governmental
authority 62 (or with other features of American constitutionalism, like
federalism 63). But even proponents of a structural basis for nondelegation concede that such an approach provides little clarity as to how the
doctrine might apply in practice. 64 Finally, pre-Ratification discourse
suffers from similar flaws. While scholars on both sides of the debate
devote significant attention to statements made by British and
American legal and political thinkers in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, 65 the most such sources can tell us is that there
was some limit on the legislature’s power to give away rulemaking
authority. 66
They do not offer standards for assessing the
constitutionality of particular delegations. 67
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in “construction,” but given their general acknowledgement of the text’s limited
informational value, that appears to be an accurate description of their analytical approach.
62 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–37 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); Rappaport, supra note 44, at 305–10. But see Mortenson & Bagley, supra note
7, at 289–332 (original understandings of legislative and executive power do not imply any
limit on delegation except permanent alienation of legislative power).
63 See Jennifer Mascott, Early Customs Laws and Delegation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1388
(2019).
64 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 44, at 312 (conceding his structure-derived test is
“vague and difficult to apply”). But cf. Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript at 7–8) (arguing
that a prohibition on delegations involving “important subjects” is implicit in the
Constitution’s nature as a fiduciary instrument governed by agency law principles (quoting
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825))); infra notes 341–42 and
accompanying text (discussing Lawson’s argument).
65 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8, at 737–44; Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 289–
332; Wurman, supra note 8, at 1518–26.
66 See Parrillo, supra note 20 (manuscript at 3) (“[C]onstitutional text, pre-ratification
discourse, and structure might possibly indicate that some unspecified constitutional limit
on delegation exists in the abstract . . . .”). For example, the fact that scholars can draw
profoundly different conclusions about the import of a paragraph from John Locke’s Second
Treatise highlights the indeterminacy of the principles pre-Ratification sources supposedly
express. Compare Wurman, supra note 8, at 1518–22 (discussing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 71 (J.W. Gough
ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 1948) (1690)), with Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at
307–09 (same).
67 As Nicholas Parrillo points out, the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy
over the English constitution also raises doubts about the probative value of any preRevolutionary sources when interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Parrillo, supra note 20
(manuscript at 5–6); see also Hamburger, supra note 8, at 93–94 (critiquing Mortenson and
Bagley for relying on European sources). According to Parrillo, the secondary literature
on nondelegation identifies only a handful of American sources from the period between
1774 and 1788, and none of them say anything revealing about the nondelegation
doctrine’s “content, stringency, or practical application.” Parrillo, supra note 20
(manuscript at 7–8).
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The lack of specificity in much of the historical evidence presents
a significant problem for an originalist approach to nondelegation. As
everyone from James Madison, 68 to John Marshall, 69 to Antonin Scalia 70
has recognized, what bedevils the nondelegation doctrine is the
difficulty of formulating a test that consistently and predictably
distinguishes permissible delegations from impermissible ones. 71
Indeed, the difficulty of this line-drawing exercise is one of the reasons
the Supreme Court adopted the “intelligible principle” test in the first
place. 72
The difficulty of deriving a workable rule from text, structure, and
pre-Ratification discourse is—or at least should be—a particular
concern for nondelegationists. After all, they want to overrule the
Court’s current precedent, and replace the “intelligible principle” test
with a more demanding one. 73 As a result, they bear the burden of
proving that the Court’s longstanding approach to nondelegation
contravenes the Constitution’s original meaning. How heavy a burden
is subject to debate. 74 But the Court has recently reaffirmed that, at
minimum, stare decisis requires “something more than ‘ambiguous


12/21/2021 11:58:47

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 133 Side B

68 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 238–39 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison) (conceding the
difficulty of “determin[ing] with precision the exact boundaries of the Legislative and
Executive powers”).
69 See Wayman, 23 U.S. at 46 (finding the “precise boundary of” the legislature’s
authority to “commit something to the discretion of the other departments” was “a subject
of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily”).
70 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(saying that because “no statute can be entirely precise . . . the debate over unconstitutional
delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of degree”).
71 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he exact line between policy and details, lawmaking and fact-finding, and legislative
and non-legislative functions ha[s] sometimes invited reasonable debate . . . .”).
72 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“[W]e have
‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’” (quoting Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
73 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘intelligible
principle’ remark has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution . . . .”).
74 There is much scholarly debate as to whether the principle of stare decisis is
compatible with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation. In particular,
commentators diverge on when—if ever—a precedent that is wrong on originalist grounds
can nonetheless be left intact. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921 (2017); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original
Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 289 (2005). See generally William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 2349, 2358–59 (2015) (citing sources).
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historical evidence’” before the Court will “flatly overrule . . . major
decisions.”75
Given the indeterminacy of text, structure, and pre-Ratification
discourse, scholars have devoted significant attention to the early
Congress’s practices—in particular, the passage (or defeat) of
legislation delegating rulemaking authority to the executive branch. 76
This evidence has two significant advantages over other sources.77
First, it offers actual examples of delegations the early Congresses
made to the executive branch, which can help us understand more
precisely which kinds of delegations were understood to be
constitutionally permissible in the Founding era. 78 Second, examining
the output of a representative legislature reduces the danger of relying
on statements made by individuals, which may represent idiosyncratic
views. 79 In addition, delegations that gained support across political
divides and that endured over time—like the Remission Act 80—are
unlikely to be aberrational. 81 Instead, they are likely the most
instructive evidence we have of what limits—if any—the Founding
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75 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep’t
of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987)).
76 See Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript at 18–49); Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7,
at 332–66; Parrillo, supra note 7, at 1318–45; Wurman, supra note 8, at 1503–18, 1550–56.
77 See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1501 (stating that scholarship examining early
legislative practices “make[s] a particularly important contribution to the originalist debate
over nondelegation”); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive
Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–79 (2007).
78 See Parrillo, supra note 20 (manuscript at 11–12).
79 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 1736 n.61 (“[A]ctual statutory
enactments . . . presumptively embody a judgment by the whole Congress, not just by
individuals, about the permissibility of delegation.”).
80 See infra Section II.C.
81 To be sure, partisan politics or individual self-interest might lead legislators to vote
in favor of particular legislation that they actually believe to be unconstitutional (or viceversa). See Lawson, supra note 14, at 398 (asserting that early federal statutes are “at best
weak evidence of original [constitutional] meaning,” because members of Congress “are
not disinterested observers”). But the fact that the early Congresses repeatedly delegated
broad authority to the executive branch would seem to mitigate such concerns. In any
event, even skeptics of early legislation concede that it has some probative value. See id.
(examining early delegation statutes because “doubts about their value go to weight rather
than admissibility”); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 555 (1994) (“Th[e] use of the First Congress’ actions to
shed light on the meaning of the Constitution is not without precedent (or justification) in
constitutional law.”). If one agrees that other sources of original constitutional meaning
are generally unhelpful in determining what kinds of delegations the Constitution was
originally understood to allow or prohibit, then early legislation becomes all the more
important. But see Lawson, supra note 14, at 403 (asserting that the value of early
congressional practice “pales before the available evidence from text, structure, and
design”).
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generation thought the Constitution imposes on delegations of
legislative power.
The difficulty for nondelegationists is that Congress’s early
practice is not in their favor. For starters, there is little affirmative
evidence in favor of a more stringent test for nondelegation than the
Court’s current “intelligible principle” formulation. By my count,
nondelegationists point to only four examples of Congress modifying
or rejecting a Founding-era legislative proposal on nondelegation
grounds. As I explain later in this Article, there is no indication
nondelegation concerns shaped three of the enactments at all. 82
Nondelegation was more clearly at issue in the fourth episode, which
involved a well-studied 1792 statute establishing the federal postal
system. But the evidence from that episode is contradictory at best. 83
It is possible that a stringent view of nondelegation influenced the early
Congress in unspoken ways—by influencing members’ votes sub
silentio, or dissuading them from proposing broad delegations in the
first place. Such possibilities, however, are not actual evidence of a
robust Founding-era doctrine. 84
The greater problem for nondelegationists is that there is
affirmative evidence supporting an expansive Founding-era view of
delegation. As a recent scholarship has shown, throughout the early
period Congress repeatedly gave the executive branch broad authority
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82 See infra notes 417–27 and accompanying text (1793 Patent Act); infra note 306
(1809 and 1810 embargo legislation). Ilan Wurman and Aaron Gordon also cite the
debates over the Alien Act of 1798 as evidence that the Constitution contained a
nondelegation principle. See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1512–14; Gordon, supra note 8, at
747. Of course, that statute passed, so the nondelegation challenges it faced were not strong
enough to persuade a majority of Congress. Wurman speculates that Congress simply did
not think that the Constitution’s general prohibition against delegation applied to this
particular legislation, but offers no explanation why it did not. See Wurman, supra note 8,
at 1514. Gordon argues that the act was “widely condemned as unconstitutional at the
time,” and that the verdict of history agrees. See Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation
Misinformation: A Rebuttal to “Delegation at the Founding” and its Progeny 50–51 (June
4, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (citing 1832 statement by John Calhoun that the act’s
unconstitutionality had been settled in public opinion, JOHN C. CALHOUN, LETTER TO
GENERAL HAMILTON ON THE SUBJECT OF STATE INTERPOSITION (1832), reprinted in REPORTS
AND PUBLIC LETTERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 144, 161 (Richard K. Crallé ed., New York, D.
Appleton & Co. 1855)), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561062.
That may be true, but the Alien and Sedition Acts were subject to a range of constitutional
objections, and nondelegation appears to have been a lesser one. See Mortenson & Bagley,
supra note 7, at 365 (“[T]he legislative debate over the constitutionality of the Alien and
Sedition Acts raged in Congress for days—but not over delegation.”).
83 See infra notes 396–411 and accompanying text.
84 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 291 (“The original public meaning of
constitutional text . . . can’t be a secret or hidden meaning.”).
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to fashion rules governing private conduct. 85 Though the Remission
Act is largely overlooked in this literature, it is a compelling example.86
Nondelegationists respond to this evidence by asserting that, even
though the Constitution generally barred Congress from giving
legislative authority to the executive, certain kinds of delegations were
permissible at the Founding.87 Justice Gorsuch, for example, believes
there were several caveats to the general prohibition on delegation.
Congress could authorize another branch to “fill up the details” of a
statutory scheme, as long as it first made “the policy decisions . . .
regulating private conduct.” 88 Scholars have echoed that view, arguing
that Congress could not delegate rulemaking authority over
“important” matters, but could with respect to less-important
“details.” 89 Justice Gorsuch also invoked an exception allowing
delegation when the power in question “overlaps” with authority the
Constitution vests in another branch—for example, with respect to
foreign affairs 90 (another category echoed by commentators). 91
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85 Mortenson and Bagley document this phenomenon in detail. Mortenson & Bagley,
supra note 7, at 332–66; see also Parrillo, supra note 20 (manuscript at 13–16) (listing
examples); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (2012) (“From the earliest days
of the Republic, Congress delegated broad authority to administrators, armed them with
extrajudicial coercive powers, created systems of administrative adjudication, and
specifically authorized administrative rulemaking.”).
86 See infra Section II.D.
87 In addition to the exceptions discussed here, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas suggest
that Congress can make application of a rule governing private conduct depend on
executive fact-finding. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 78–79 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment). The classic example is “contingent legislation”—a statute
that goes into effect on the occurrence of a particular event, the identification of which is
a “factual” question permissibly left to the executive branch. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 693 (1892) (“[T]he president was . . . the mere agent of [Congress] . . . to ascertain
and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.”). As even
nondelegationists concede, successfully applying such a distinction depends “on the clarity
of the line between fact and law, and that is decidedly not a clear line.” Gary Lawson, “I’m
Leavin’ It (All) Up to You”: Gundy and the (Sort-of) Resurrection of the Subdelegation Doctrine,
2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 66–67.
88 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825)). Justice Gorsuch justified this exception by invoking John Marshall’s
1825 opinion in Wayman v. Southard, in which the Chief Justice suggested, in passing, a
distinction between statutes on “important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by
the legislature itself,” and “those of less interest,” in which Congress could delegate
authority to the executive to “fill up the details.” 23 U.S. at 43.
89 See Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1502, 1516–
17.
90 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
91 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 782; Rappaport, supra note 44, at 352–54; Wurman,
supra note 8, at 1549 n.322.
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Several scholars have also suggested that Congress could delegate
authority to regulate the provision of public benefits, but not private
rights 92—a position Justice Thomas seems to endorse. 93 Finally, several
scholars have suggested that Congress historically could delegate
authority to the executive branch when it was “necessary”—i.e., when
the task delegated was one Congress simply could not perform itself.94
These exceptions are profoundly important for the
nondelegationist position, yet they are deeply flawed. As I explain in
detail in Part III, without them nondelegationists have difficulty
explaining a number of broad delegations made by the early
Congress. 95 To be sure, these exceptions may not sufficiently explain
all instances in which Congress granted legislative authority to the
executive. There are Founding-era delegations—including the
Remission Act itself 96—that do not fit easily into any exceptional
category. 97 More important, it is highly doubtful whether these
exceptions actually existed at the Founding. As I further explore in
Part III, there is virtually no evidence in their favor, and meaningful
evidence against. 98 If that analysis is correct, the originalist argument
in favor of a more stringent nondelegation doctrine seems to be
unsound. It simply cannot account for a number of broad delegations
of legislative authority at the Founding.
II. DELEGATING THE REMISSION POWER
Before assessing the historical viability of various nondelegationist
arguments, this Part sets the stage by detailing what arguably was the
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92 See HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 3 n.b, 85–87; Bamzai, supra note 17, at 182 (“A
distinction between rights and privileges might explain several laws enacted in early
Congresses that delegated authority to the executive branch . . . .”); Wurman, supra note 8,
at 1548 (“Perhaps Congress had more power to delegate authority to establish public
privileges.”).
93 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 83 n.7 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
94 See Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript at 42–46); Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript
at 35–37); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1542, 1544, 1545.
95 See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 8, at 107 (saying delegation defenders “do[] not
point to any early instance when the Executive . . . made binding rules or adjudications that
were national and domestic in their scope”); Gordon, supra note 82 (manuscript at 35)
(“[E]very enactment [delegation defenders] discuss either falls into one of the wellestablished ‘exceptions’ to the principle of nondelegation or is obviously not a delegation
of legislative power at all.” (quoting Hamburger, supra note 8, at 106)); Wurman, supra note
8, at 1550–54 (describing several early delegations as addressing subjects that were not
“important”).
96 See infra Part III.
97 See, e.g., Parrillo, supra note 7, at 1301–02 (arguing that a 1798 land tax does not
fall into either the foreign affairs or privileges exceptions).
98 See infra Section III.B.
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99 Report on the Petition of Christopher Saddler, 19 January 1790, NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton) (Jan. 19, 1790) [hereinafter Saddler Report],
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-06-02-0089
[https://perma.cc
/2VJL-PYDA].
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 122.
107 Id.
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First Congress’s most significant delegation—the Remission Act of
1790. For a statute granting such important power, the Remission
Act’s origins were innocuous enough. On January 19, 1790, Alexander
Hamilton sent a letter to the House of Representatives. 99 His
ostensible purpose was to report on the petition of Christopher
Saddler, an American mariner seeking relief from a fine imposed for
his noncompliance with customs regulations Congress had recently
enacted. The House committee charged with responding to Saddler’s
petition referred it to Hamilton for a recommendation. In his brief
report, Hamilton had little to say about Saddler himself. Though
Hamilton thought that relief was likely justified, he wanted more
information about the case before making a formal
recommendation. 100
Hamilton did not stop there, however. Instead, he urged the
House to develop a comprehensive solution to the problem of
unintentional customs violations. 101 There were many cases in which
persons who had unknowingly broken the law incurred “considerable
forfeitures.”102 In Hamilton’s view, this state of affairs made it a
“necessity” that Congress “vest[] somewhere a discretionary power of
granting relief.” 103 Hamilton did not say to whom Congress should give
such power. Given its potential impact on the federal fisc, the question
was of such “delicacy and importance” that it should be the subject of
“mature deliberation.” 104 But Hamilton clearly did not think Congress
should retain the power for itself, if only to avoid the “inconvenience”
of having to rule on individual applications for relief. 105
Hamilton’s lobbying effort bore fruit several months later, when
Congress passed the Remission Act of 1790. 106 The Act transferred to
the Treasury Secretary the legislature’s own authority to spare from
punishment those who unintentionally violated important federal
revenue laws. 107 As this Part explains, the question of where to locate
such an important power provoked intense debate in Congress, which
considered numerous configurations of authority before settling on
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the Treasury Secretary. 108 Uncertainty and dispute continued through
the 1790s, even as the first Treasury Secretaries—Hamilton included—
exercised the power to its fullest extent. 109 Ultimately, however,
remission became a permanent feature of the early administrative
landscape, bestowing upon the executive a discretionary authority that
rivals the powers modern nondelegationists find so objectionable.110
A. Remission and Revenue
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108 See infra Section II.B.
109 See infra Section II.C.
110 See infra Section II.D.
111 See Mascott, supra note 63, at 1394 (“Congress felt it was so critical to quickly raise
revenue that it enacted laws imposing customs duties prior to establishing the Treasury
Department and other executive agencies.”).
112 See Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1466 & n.96.
113 See GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN STATE 6–8 (2016) (“[C]ustoms revenue almost singlehandedly funded the
federal government.”).
114 See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790).
115 See Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55.
116 See, e.g., id. § 30; Act of July 31, 1789 § 12.
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At its core, remission was about revenue. When Congress convened in 1789, one its first orders of business was to pass legislation
regulating the collection of customs duties on goods imported into the
United States by sea. 111 This was no small matter. Customs duties were
the federal government’s lifeblood, constituting more than ninety
percent of total revenue for the first two decades following
Ratification. 112 It is no exaggeration to say that, without an effective
means of collecting such duties, the federal government would have
been unable to function. 113
There were two principal statutes regulating customs collection.
The Collection Act of 1789 served three purposes: it detailed the duties
owed on various categories of goods, it announced regulations on the
manner of importation, and it prescribed rules governing federal
officers’ collection of duties owed. 114 Its companion, the Registering
Act of 1789, had a narrower scope, but was no less important: it
specified the requirements for registering a ship as a “vessel of the
United States,” a status that exempted the owner from payment of the
duties on imports specified in the Collection Act. 115
Crucially, both statutes prescribed fines and forfeitures for
violations of many of the acts’ provisions. These penalties ranged
broadly, from a one hundred dollar fine for lesser offenses, to
forfeiture of goods and vessels themselves (often worth thousands of
dollars). 116 To impose a statutorily prescribed penalty, the government
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had to go to federal district court, which had exclusive jurisdiction over
all suits for “penalties and forfeitures” under federal law. 117
It was essential that the government be able to penalize customs
violators. Whenever someone failed to pay the duties they owed,
revenue suffered. But collection was difficult. According to many
historians, early Americans were inveterate smugglers—a tradition that
dated back to the colonial period and continued forward through the
War of 1812 and beyond. 118 The Atlantic coastline’s sheer length
presented a huge challenge to the skeletal staff of customs officers
responsible for collecting duties. 119 The fact that customs officers
often lacked critical enforcement tools did not help matters. 120 Given
these difficulties, deterrence depended on the prospect of significant
penalties. Fines and forfeitures were financially important in another
way. By law, the three principal customs officers for the district in
which a seizure took place shared half of any penalty amongst
themselves121—a significant financial inducement for federal officers
whose compensation was otherwise low. 122 Similarly, informants who
helped identify customs evaders could also share in the recovery.123
The challenge the Founding generation faced was how to balance
rigorous enforcement of important federal laws with the need to
provide justice to individuals. As Hamilton and his contemporaries
recognized (in 1790 and later), there was a real danger of significant
fines and forfeitures resulting from unintentional violations of the
customs laws. 124 Indeed, the first Collection Act created largely a strict
liability regime. With a few exceptions, those who violated the Act were
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117 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.
118 See, e.g., THOMAS C. BARROW, TRADE AND EMPIRE: THE BRITISH CUSTOMS SERVICE
IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1660–1775 (1967); CATHY MATSON, MERCHANTS AND EMPIRE:
TRADING IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (1998); JOSHUA M. SMITH, BORDERLAND SMUGGLING:
PATRIOTS, LOYALISTS, AND ILLICIT TRADE IN THE NORTHEAST, 1783–1820 (2006); THOMAS
M. TRUXES, DEFYING EMPIRE: TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (2008).
119 SMITH, supra note 118, at 10–12.
120 See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 62, 1 Stat. 145, 175 (repealed 1799) (permitting
President to order construction of only ten revenue cutters, at a cost of no more than
$10,000). Perhaps more importantly, while officers could search any vessel without a
warrant (and any building with one), see Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1466–67, Congress did not
grant them legal authority to search merchant books and papers until 1863. Act of Mar. 3,
1863, ch. 76, § 7, 12 Stat. 737, 740. This made it difficult for customs officers to ferret out
instances where importers paid lower duties by deliberately undervaluing their goods. See
NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 235–36 (2013); RAO, supra note 113, at 184–86
(discussing problems early customs officers had in accurately valuing imported goods).
121 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 38, 1 Stat. 29, 48 (repealed 1790).
122 See Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1469, 1510 n.352.
123 Act of July 31, 1789 § 38.
124 See infra notes 136–44 and accompanying text.
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subject to penalties irrespective of whether they intended to evade
paying the duties they owed. 125
For many contemporaries, this rigidity was essential. According
to the Remission Act’s chief congressional proponent, Fisher Ames,
Congress had two choices in designing the customs system. It could
make the laws “loosely,” which would give customs officers
“considerable discretion” in executing them. 126 Or it could make the
rules “so strict as to be in some degree rigid.” 127 For Ames, the latter
was the better approach, 128 as effective revenue collection depended
on the consistent application of “certain rule[s].” 129 Hamilton agreed;
as he had explained to the New York legislature in 1787, “certainty”
was one of the two “great objects” of any taxation system.130
The need for “certainty” was especially acute with respect to the
penalties for customs violations. As Hamilton explained to Congress,
“the security of the revenue” could not depend on voluntary
compliance with the customs laws. 131 Lax enforcement would merely
encourage those who owed duties on imported goods to “avoid . . .
payment.” 132 Accordingly, as Hamilton’s successor later instructed
customs collectors, they had to execute the laws “without reference to
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125 For example, of the dozens of prohibitions in the first Collection Act, only two
depended on the offender’s state of mind. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 16, 1 Stat. 29,
41 (repealed 1790) (providing a $200 fine for discrepancies between the manifest and
goods actually delivered, unless it was due to “unavoidable necessity or accident, and not
with intention to defraud the revenue”); id. § 23 (allowing forfeiture of packaged goods if
the contents differed from the entry made at the customhouse due to “intention to defraud
the revenue”).
126 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames).
127 Id.
128 See id. (“He thought the latter the best mode.”).
129 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1166 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Ames).
130 Alexander Hamilton, New York Assembly. Remarks on an Act for Raising Certain Yearly
Taxes Within This State (Feb. 17, 1787), in 4 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 95 (Harold
C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962). The other “great object[]” of taxation was
“[e]quality.” Id.
131 Final Version: First Report on the Further Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit
[13 December 1790], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton) (Dec. 13,
1790) (emphasis omitted), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-0702-0227-0003 [https://perma.cc/H2TX-XMPZ]. Though Hamilton expressed confidence
that respectable merchants would pay the duties they owed, to maintain confidence in the
system as a whole it was “essential[] . . . that every possible guard should be set on the
fraudulent few.” Report on Defects in the Existing Laws of Revenue, 22 April 1790, NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton) (Apr. 22, 1790), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-06-02-0248
[https://perma.cc/FH6G75UN]. And he was generally skeptical about public virtue as a sound basis of republican
government. See GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT 70–75 (1970).
132 Final Version, supra note 131.
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any circumstances of fraud or innocence.” 133 Only the “strictest
method” of enforcement could prevent the revenue system “from
being deranged.”134 Or, in the words of one of the Remission Act’s
original proponents in Congress, imposition of the fines and
forfeitures prescribed for customs violations should be “nearly
inevitable,” to ensure “safe and effectual collection of the revenue.” 135
As everyone recognized, strict enforcement of the customs laws
could result in manifest injustice. 136 Indeed, Hamilton urged Congress
to create a mechanism for remitting fines and forfeitures precisely
because violators would run afoul of the law simply due to
“inadvertence” or “want of information.” 137 This problem was
especially acute in the early days of a new regulatory regime, when
merchants were still learning the rules. 138 But the customs regulations’
complexity would inevitably lead to the imposition of unwarranted
penalties, therefore requiring the “constant existence” of a “power
capable of affording relief.” 139
Members of Congress agreed that remission was essential to the
healthy functioning of the revenue system. “[N]o person,” argued
one, “ought to be liable . . . who is not guilty of a violation of the laws
intentionally or willfully.” 140 Granting relief in such cases would not
be a question of “mercy”—it was instead a matter of “justice.” 141
Accordingly, if the rules governing customs collection were to be
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133 Frederick Arthur Baldwin Dalzell, Taxation with Representation: Federal Revenue in the
Early Republic 168 (Oct. 1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University)
(ProQuest) (quoting Draft Letter from Oliver Wolcott, Sec’y of the Treasury, Dep’t of the
Treasury, to Robert Purviance, Collector, Dep’t of the Treasury (May 6, 1797) (on file with
the Connecticut Historical Society, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers, box 17, folder 16)).
134 Id. (quoting Draft Letter from Oliver Wolcott, supra note 133).
135 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (1790) (statement of Rep. Lawrence). Such comments
echoed the views of Cesare Beccaria, a leading eighteenth-century theorist of criminal
punishment whose views were highly influential in the early United States. See CESARE
BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 63 (Richard Bellamy ed.,
Richard Davies, Virginia Cox & Richard Bellamy trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995)
(1764) (“The certainty of even a mild punishment will make a bigger impression than the
fear of a more awful one which is united to a hope of not being punished at all.”); John D.
Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition
Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 206–15 (2009) (discussing Beccaria’s early influence
in the United States).
136 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (1790) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (arguing fines
and forfeitures for customs violations “ought to be as nearly inevitable as is in any ways
consistent with mercy to individuals”).
137 Saddler Report, supra note 99.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1167 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Sturges).
141 Id.
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“strict,” then it was necessary to provide “some relaxation” in deserving
cases. 142 Indeed, as one representative noted, it would be “impossible
to get along” without “a power placed somewhere to remit
penalties.” 143 In that sense, remission was a power “co-existent with the
revenue laws” themselves. 144
B. Locating Remission
The remission power may have been necessary, but it was also
dangerous. If not exercised carefully, it would lessen the certainty of
rule-enforcement and hamper revenue collection more than it would
benefit deserving individuals. 145 To members of Congress, it was
therefore a “delicate power,”146 to be exercised with “a great deal of
circumspection.”147
Indeed, some representatives opposed the
Remission Act entirely on the ground that it would undermine customs
collection and harm the federal fisc. 148 Therefore, the goal in
structuring the remission power, according to Ames, was to grant relief
while creating “the least risk of injuring the revenue.” 149
For Congress, the hard part lay in figuring out where to locate this
“delicate power.” 150 When Hamilton tendered his proposal, the task
of balancing the need for certainty against the demands of justice had
fallen on the legislature itself. Before passage of the Remission Act
(and after), individuals who thought they did not deserve punishment
for their statutory violations sought relief directly from Congress. 151
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142 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames); see also 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1167 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (saying without
remission, “persons absolutely violating the laws, whether intentionally or through
ignorance, would . . . be precluded from all relief”); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2291 (1797)
(statement of Rep. Coit) (saying the original 1790 Remission Act was “necessary” because
“[i]t was made the duty of officers to prosecute in all cases”).
143 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (1797) (statement of Rep. Coit).
144 Id. at 2285 (statement of Rep. Sitgreaves).
145 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1168 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Stone).
146 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames).
147 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (1790) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
148 See DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 6, 1790, as reprinted in 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, SECOND SESSION: JANUARY–MARCH 1790, at 175 (Helen E. Veit,
Charlene Bangs Bickford, Kenneth R. Bowling & William Charles DiGiacomantonio eds.,
1994) [hereinafter 12 DHFFC] (“[A] few were of opinion, that the passing any act for the
remission of fines, would operate to the great disadvantage of the public revenue . . . .”).
149 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1166 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Ames).
150 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames).
151 See, e.g., 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: PETITION HISTORIES AND NONLEGISLATIVE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 421–
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Such legislative relief for individuals was common at the Founding.
Before and after ratification of the Constitution, at both the state and
national level, individuals typically presented their claims against the
government to the legislature. 152 This was true not only with respect
to requests for government largesse, as with military pensions 153 and
disaster relief, 154 but also for those seeking respite from the allegedly
unjust application of general laws. 155 Indeed, as recent scholarship has
shown, one of the early Congresses’ most important functions was
responding to individual petitions seeking legislative favor. 156 To that
end, one of the First Congress’s initial actions was to develop a system
for receiving and responding to petitions, which generally involved
referral to a congressional committee or to an executive branch
official. 157 The referee would investigate and prepare a report and
recommendation; Congress would then decide whether to grant the
requested relief, usually via private bill or resolution. 158
Hamilton’s proposal, however, prompted Congress to do
something unusual—divest itself entirely of the responsibility for
granting individual relief from customs fines and forfeitures. In this
period, Congress experimented with various arrangements for
addressing the thousands of petitions it received each year. 159 At times
it delegated decision-making authority to officials from the executive
branch and judiciary. For instance, Congress authorized Treasury
Department officers to decide certain classes of contract claims against
the government, 160 and it delegated responsibility for deciding
Revolutionary War pension claims to the judges of the federal circuit
courts. 161 Crucially, however, Congress retained the ability to revisit
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22, 423, 426–27 [hereinafter 8 DHFFC] (Kenneth R. Bowling, William Charles
diGiacomantonio & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1998) (describing pre-Remission Act
petitions submitted to the First Congress); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1788 (1797) (statement of
Rep. Swanwick) (considering two 1797 petitions seeking remission of penalties for “having
sold wine and spirits by retail, without license”).
152 See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution
from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 637 (1985).
153 See Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE
L.J. 1538, 1586–87 (2018).
154 See MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 1–16 (2013).
155 See Maggie Blackhawk, Equity Outside the Courts, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2042
(2020).
156 See McKinley, supra note 153, at 1547–48.
157 See id. at 1587.
158 Id.
159 See id. at 1579–1600.
160 See Shimomura, supra note 152, at 644–45.
161 Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (repealed 1793); see McKinley,
supra note 153, at 1587 (discussing the Pension Act).
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their decisions, either via appeal or through the appropriation process
(i.e., by refusing to pay amounts awarded by referees). 162
In light of this history, Congress had a hard time agreeing in
whom to vest the remission power. Under the first bill introduced in
the House, a panel of judicial officers—the local federal district judge,
district attorney, and marshal—would handle petitions for relief.163 A
subsequent version of the bill gave the district judge alone the power
to remit, though the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State,
and the Attorney General had to approve any remission of a penalty
greater than $5,000.164 But when the Senate returned its amended
version of the bill, the district judge’s role was reduced to hearing
evidence and transmitting a statement of facts to the same three
cabinet officers, who then made the decision as to whether remission
was warranted. 165 The reasons for the change are not clear, though it
appears that the Senate modeled its proposal on British practice, in
which a central administrative board had the power to “relax” the
revenue laws in “cases of hardship.” 166 Hamilton himself suggested as
much in his initial recommendation: creating a discretionary power to
grant relief would align the United States with “the usual policy of
Commercial Nations.” 167 Hamilton did not mention Great Britain


12/21/2021 11:58:47

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 139 Side B

162 See McKinley, supra note 153, at 1588; Shimomura, supra note 152, at 644–45.
163 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1166 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
164 Mitigation of Fines Bill, H.R. 45, 1st Cong. (as reported, Mar. 8, 1790), reprinted in
6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, MITIGATION OF FINES BILL [HR-38] THROUGH
RESOLUTION ON UNCLAIMED WESTERN LANDS 1482–84 [hereinafter 6 DHFFC] (Charlene
Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
165 Mitigation of Fines Bill, H.R. 45, 1st Cong. (as amended by the Senate, Mar. 19,
1790), reprinted in 6 DHFFC, supra note 164, at 1484, 1485. Under the Senate proposal,
only two of the three executive officers needed to agree in order to grant remission. Id. An
earlier proposal in the Senate envisioned a more complicated procedure, in which the
district judge made the initial determination as to whether fraud was involved, then the
three cabinet officials decided whether relief was warranted in light of the facts, and then
the judge made the final decision as to the “reasonable” quantum of relief to be granted
(but no greater than the amount approved by the executive officers). H.R. 45 (as
recommended by Senate committee report, Mar. 19, 1790), as reprinted in 6 DHFFC, supra
note 164, at 1483 n.12.
166 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames); see also 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1167 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Fitzsimons) (urging
Congress to consider “the practice in England, where . . . application for relief is made to
the commissioners”); United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 295 (1825) (“The
powers given by this statute to the [British] Commissioners of the Treasury, are very
analogous to those given by our act to the Secretary of the Treasury . . . .”). By statute,
British commissioners had broad authority to restore forfeited goods that “arose without
any [d]esign or [i]ntention of [f]raud.” An Act for the More Effectual Prevention of
Smuggling in This Kingdom, 27 Geo. 3 c. 32, § 15 (1787) (UK).
167 Saddler Report, supra note 99.
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specifically in his report, but he often modeled his approach to
customs collection on British practice. 168
Whatever its genesis, the Senate’s switch to centralized
decisionmaking caused consternation in the House. Critics argued
that delegating authority to executive officers in Philadelphia would
delay needed respite for merchants located far from the seat of
government. 169 The Senate proposal also gave the power to cabinet
officials who were less responsive than district judges to local concerns
and conditions. 170 In response, the amendment’s defenders conceded
that the new proposal would “lengthen” the remission process.171 But
that was a necessary evil. Centralized decisions were essential to
ensuring that the government enforced the laws governing maritime
commerce consistently and predictably. As one House member put it,
putting remission in the hands of the executive branch would
“eventually produce strict justice, and tend more effectually to secure
the revenue.”172
Critics also questioned the amendment’s constitutionality.
Specifically, two House members argued that the Senate proposal
improperly granted “judiciary powers” to executive branch officials. 173
The precise basis for these objections is unclear,174 but they may have
had some traction. After debate on the Senate version of the bill, the
House responded with a version that vested remission power in the
individual Justices of the Supreme Court.175
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168 See, e.g., Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs, 30 November 1789,
NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton) (Nov. 30, 1789), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-05-02-0364
[https://perma.cc/FT4CQZW8] (discussing “practice of the british Customs” regarding fee collection by customs
officers, because Britain is the “nation from whom we derive our language & in a great
measure our usages of business”); see also RAO, supra note 113, at 53 (“Hamilton . . . wanted
to pattern the new federal government on the blueprint of the British state.”).
169 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (1790) (statement of Rep. Goodhue).
170 Id. (statement of Rep. Jackson).
171 Id. at 1474 (statement of Rep. Sherman).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1475 (statement of Rep. Gerry); see also id. (statement of Rep. Huntington)
(the Senate bill “referr[ed] matters of judicial determination to a Chancellorate unknown
to the Constitution”).
174 Compare id. (statement of Rep. Gerry) (suggesting that designating the heads of
executive departments as “Judges” in deciding on remission petitions infringed on the
President and Senate’s combined power to appoint federal judges), with id. (statement of
Rep. Sedgwick) (responding to Gerry’s objection by pointing out that the designated
department heads had already been constitutionally appointed).
175 See Mitigation of Forfeitures, H.R. 57, 1st Cong. (as read in the House, Apr. 29,
1790), reprinted in 6 DHFFC, supra note 164, at 1488–89.
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Yet for reasons unknown, 176 the final version of the Act doubled
down on its concentration of power in the executive branch. It gave
the remission power to the Treasury Secretary alone. Under the Act,
the Secretary could remit any penalty incurred under the customs laws
if, “in his opinion,” the violation was committed “without wilful
negligence or any intention of fraud.” 177 The Secretary could remit
the entire penalty, including the customs officers’ share—a power not
included in the original House proposal. And, most important, he
could remit the whole penalty or “any part thereof . . . upon such
terms or conditions as he may deem reasonable and just.” 178 In other
words, once the Secretary determined that the petitioner had incurred
a penalty without fraudulent intent, he had complete discretion to
restore to the petitioner as much or as little of his property as the
Secretary thought reasonable. And it really was complete discretion.
The Act did not provide for review of the Secretary’s decisions—not by
the judiciary, not by the President, and not by Congress. 179 Federal
judges were still involved in the process, but only to the extent that they
heard evidence and transmitted a statement of facts to the Secretary. 180
The decision of whether to impose all, some, or none of the prescribed
penalty lay entirely in the executive branch.
C. Affirming Remission
Hamilton and his successors did not hesitate to use the broad
power Congress gave them. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, from
1790 to 1807 the Treasury Secretaries granted relief in over ninety
percent of the remission cases presented to them. 181 In most of those
cases, they granted nearly complete relief, only withholding a small
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176 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122. No explanation for the change is
recorded in the published legislative record. I discuss the possibilities in Part IV.
177 Id. at 122–23.
178 Id.
179 See United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 285 (1825) (concluding that
“no one can question” the Secretary’s determination regarding a petitioner’s fraudulent
intent: “It is a subject [committed] to his sound discretion.”); The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas.
719, 722 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9072) (Story, J.) (finding the Secretary’s determination
that the facts stated by the district court are sufficient to justify remission “is conclusive, and
cannot be overhaled in any collateral inquiry”). I am aware of no court case involving a
challenge to a remission decision by a disappointed petitioner. Cf. Morris, 23 U.S. at 288–
89 (rejecting customs officer’s challenge to the Act’s grant of authority to remit the portion
of a fine or forfeiture due to the officer). The only way a petitioner could “appeal” the
Secretary’s refusal to grant remission would be to petition Congress for relief subsequently.
I am aware of no instance in which a petitioner did so.
180 See Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1484 & n.212.
181 See id. at 1452.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 140 Side B



43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 141 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B$5/<&.BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2021]

30

DELEGATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND IMPROVISATION

271

percentage of the penalty to pay court costs. 182 But in roughly a third
of these cases the Secretaries exercised their authority to grant
whatever partial relief they deemed “just” and “reasonable.”183 The
level of partial remission varied widely; in most cases the Secretaries
remitted all but a small portion of the penalty, but in certain cases the
government retained substantial sums. 184
Despite—or perhaps because of—the Secretaries’ willing exercise
of their power, remission became more entrenched over the next
decade. The 1790 Act was supposed to expire after a year. 185 As a
member of the House later explained, Congress included this sunset
provision as a concession to those who had concerns about “the
propriety of the law.” 186 Yet the legislature repeatedly reauthorized the
remission statute in the 1790s,187 and added parallel remission
provisions to other laws related to revenue and commerce.188
That said, when Congress sought to consolidate and expand the
Treasury Secretary’s authority in 1797, a brief but sharp debate
erupted over extension of such broad and unreviewable authority. 189
The legislation’s proponents leaned heavily on precedent. The new
bill, they argued, largely confirmed the authority the Secretary had
exercised from the days of the First Congress—and had exercised
properly. 190 In response, critics acknowledged that the Secretary’s
powers under the proposed bill were substantially the same as before.
What they questioned was “the principle of the law.” 191 For the most
part, they doubted whether it was a good idea to concentrate so much
power in the hands of a single individual. 192 Doing so gave him great
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182 See id. at 1488.
183 See id. at 1487–88.
184 See id. at 1485, 1488.
185 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 122, 123.
186 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (1797) (statement of Rep. Coit).
187 Act of Mar. 2, 1795, ch. 37, 1 Stat. 425, 425; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 35, § 1, 1 Stat.
275, 275; Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 218, 218.
188 See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 43, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (power to remit fines
and forfeitures incurred for violating act regulating distilled spirits); Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch.
2, § 6, 1 Stat. 613, 615 (same for violations of 1799 embargo against France).
189 In addition to remitting fines and forfeitures, the 1797 Act gave the Secretary the
additional power to remit “disabilit[ies]”—for instance, if a ship was denied an American
registry (entitling it to lower tonnage duties), the Secretary could order that it be provided
one. See Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat. 506, 506; 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (1797)
(statement of Rep. Sitgreaves) (1797 expansion of remission power was meant to include
laws for registering and licensing vessels).
190 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2290–91 (1797) (statement of Rep. Coit).
191 Id. at 2285 (statement of Rep. Livingston).
192 See id. at 2287 (statement of Rep. W. Lyman) (arguing the authority to remit all
revenue-related penalties was a power “too great to be left to any one man”); id.at 2287
(statement of Rep. Swanwick) (“[T]he powers proposed to be placed in the Secretary of
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the Treasury were . . . too large to be put in the hands of any one person . . . .”); id. at 2286
(similar).
193 Id. at 2286 (statement of Rep. Livingston).
194 Id. at 2291 (statement of Rep. Livingston).
195 Id. at 2285; see also id. at 2284–86 (statement of Rep. Livingston) (the remission bill
“place[d] in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury Legislative business”).
196 Id. at 2285 (statement of Rep. Livingston).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 2287 (statement of Rep. Livingston).
199 Id. at 2287–89 (statements of Rep. Livingston). Specifically, Livingston proposed
that the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, and the Attorney General
collectively rule on remission, to guard against the pernicious effect that “influence” could
have on one person. Id. Livingston did not specify to whom the board’s decisions should
be appealed.
200 Id. at 2290–92 (statements of Rep. Livingston).
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“influence,” which he might use for the benefit of the wealthy and
powerful and to the detriment of the public interest. 193 This was
especially true because the Secretary’s decision was wholly
unreviewable; with no one to “call him to account,” nothing prevented
him from exercising his discretionary authority in ways that favored a
chosen few.194
Remission’s most vocal critic, Edward Livingston, went further. In
his view, the entire remission scheme was unconstitutional—because it
delegated legislative authority to an executive branch officer. The
power to remit penalties was originally “lodged” in the legislature, and
Congress had no right to “delegate it to another.” 195 He noted his
colleagues’ argument that Congress needed to free itself from the
burdensome responsibility of responding to individual petitions, but
he rejected it. 196 Their constituents had elected them precisely to
attend to such matters. “Were [members of Congress] to get rid of
[this] business, by throwing it upon their officers?” he asked. 197 No—
remission was “Legislative business” which “should not be transferred
from [Congress’s] hands.” 198
Livingston’s nondelegation critique was forceful, but it did not last
long. Perhaps sensing that his colleagues did not share his constitutional scruples, he quickly switched gears. If the burden of responding
to individual claims for relief was “too great . . . [for] the Legislature,”
then the better option would be for remission to be exercised by a
multi-member board, whose decisions would be subject to appeal. 199
When the House decisively voted down that amendment, Livingston
changed course again, arguing—rather incoherently—that the 1797
bill effectively gave the Treasury Secretary “the power to . . . pardon
crimes,” which the Constitution vested only in the President. 200
In the end, Livingston’s constitutional and policy arguments
failed to defeat the bill. He was not alone in his opposition—other

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 142 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B$5/<&.BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2021]

30

DELEGATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND IMPROVISATION

273

members of the House voiced doubts about reauthorizing the Act in
its same form, 201 and the vote in favor of the bill was fifty to thirtyfour. 202 The vote was partisan, though not entirely so; of the yeas, ten
Republicans joined thirty-nine Federalists and one independent in
supporting the bill (only one Federalist voted in opposition). 203 To
mollify the objectors’ concerns, the Act was set to expire in 1801. 204
But in 1800 Congress made the Remission Act permanent. 205
Moreover, in future years, Republican-controlled Congresses included
parallel remission provisions in other statutes. 206
Ironically, the person most affected by Congress’s steady
expansion of the remission power was one of the 1797 Act’s opponents,
Albert Gallatin. As a first-term representative from western Pennsylvania, Gallatin voted against the bill. 207 Though his reasons for opposing
it are unknown, a year later Gallatin argued (unsuccessfully) that a bill
giving the President broad discretion to raise a provisional army of up
to twenty thousand troops was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority to the executive branch. 208 Yet when the
Republicans swept into power in 1800 and Gallatin became Treasury
Secretary, he used the remission authority as extensively as his
Federalist predecessors. 209 Indeed, when a Federalist member of
Congress accused Gallatin of not granting relief generously enough
during the War of 1812, an investigating House committee concluded
that he had exercised the remission authority in a manner both
“liberal” and “just.” 210
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201 Id. at 2287 (statement of Rep. W. Lyman); id. (statement of Rep. Swanwick); id. at
2292 (statement of Rep. Nicholas).
202 Id. at 2292.
203 I used the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, 1774–Present, https://
bioguideretro.congress.gov/ [https://perma.cc/U4VG-976E], to determine party affiliations for the House members who voted on the 1797 bill.
204 Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 13, § 4, 1 Stat. 506, 507 (continuing remission power
through the end of the next session of Congress); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (1797)
(statement of Rep. Swanwick) (the sunset provision was “was the only thing which would
make [the bill] in any degree palatable”).
205 Act of Feb. 11, 1800, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 7, 7.
206 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 33, § 1, 2 Stat. 804, 805 (authorizing remission of
“all fines, penalties, and forfeitures” incurred under the Jeffersonian embargo laws); Act of
Jan. 9, 1808, ch. 8, § 6, 2 Stat. 453, 454 (power to remit fines and forfeitures incurred for
violating Embargo Act).
207 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2292 (1797).
208 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1538–39 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin); Mortenson &
Bagley, supra note 7, at 359–62.
209 See Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1488, 1488 n.228.
210 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 1282 (1813) (report of Rep. Quincy).
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211 There is no indication that the term “reasonable and just” was a legal term of art
with a specific meaning the Secretary could readily apply to a particular set of facts. See
Parrillo, supra note 7, at 1369–70 (phrase “just and equitable” was not a term of art in the
late 18th century (quoting Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 70, § 22, 1 Stat. 580, 589)); Dep’t of
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 79 n.4 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that application of the terms “unequal” and “unreasonable” “could
be said to call for the President to exercise policy judgment” (quoting Field v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 692 (1892))). See generally supra note 87 (discussing nondelegationists’ view that
the Constitution allows Congress to make application of a statutory rule depend on
executive fact-finding).
212 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (2019) (plurality opinion).
213 Id.
214 Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 2143.
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To recap: less than a year after the Constitution’s ratification,
Congress delegated broad authority to a single executive branch
official. That power allowed the Treasury Secretary to modify penalties
Congress had designated for violations of critically important federal
law, in whatever way the official deemed “reasonable and just”
(including imposing no penalty at all). 211 The power delegated was a
core legislative power: Congress’s authority to waive enforcement of
the laws it had enacted, in response to individual petitions for relief.
There was no mechanism for reviewing the Secretary’s decisions. In
addition, Congress made—and repeatedly affirmed—this delegation
in the face of serious concerns about the wisdom of concentrating too
much power in the hands of an unaccountable government officer,
and over objections that such vesting was constitutionally
impermissible.
To appreciate the breadth of this delegation, we can compare it
to the statute that Justice Gorsuch found so objectionable in Gundy.
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
requires individuals convicted of a sex offense to register in a national
system, and sets forth the registration requirements they must fulfill. 212
Yet the statute gives the Attorney General authority to decide which
requirements apply to individuals convicted of a qualifying offense
prior to SORNA’s enactment. 213 Justice Gorsuch complained that this
discretion effectively empowered the nation’s chief law enforcement
officer “to write his own criminal code” governing numerous
citizens. 214 Making matters worse, the Attorney General was “free to
change his mind at any point” about which requirements to impose on
pre-Act offenders. 215
The discretion Congress afforded the Treasury Secretary in 1790
was remarkably similar. Like the Attorney General under SORNA, the
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Secretary had free reign to decide the extent to which particular
statutory provisions would apply to those who violated the law. The
Secretary was “free to change his mind at any point” about what
penalties to impose on offenders. 216 In fact, unlike the Attorney
General under SORNA, the Remission Act allowed the Treasury
Secretary to change his approach on a case-by-case basis. 217 And he
similarly made such decisions with no guidance from Congress as to
what portion of a penalty to remit, other than whatever amount he
deemed “reasonable and just.” 218
There were limits to the Secretary’s discretion under the
Remission Act, but the same is true of the Attorney General under
SORNA. The Secretary could only grant remission to a congressionally
defined subset of offenders—those who had acted “without . . . any
intention of fraud.” 219 SORNA similarly gives the Attorney General
discretion only with respect to persons who committed a sex offense
prior to the Act’s passage. 220 Under the Remission Act, the Secretary
could only choose a penalty within the statutory bounds set by
Congress. That is just like what Justice Gorsuch found so objectionable
in SORNA; it allows the Attorney General to impose on pre-Act
offenders “all of the statute’s requirements, some of them, or none of
them.” 221 Finally, the Secretary had to grant remission that was, in his
view, “reasonable and just.” Though SORNA’s text includes no like
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216 Id.
217 In practice, it appears that the early Treasury Secretaries may have been more
consistent in their approach to remission than the Attorneys General were regarding the
application of SORNA’s registration requirements. Compare Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1487–
89 (describing broadly consistent rates of remission across two decades), with Gundy, 139 S.
Ct. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (detailing post-SORNA shifts in Attorney General
policy). But the possibility that the Treasury Secretaries happened to exercise their
discretion consistently does not make the initial delegation any less capacious.
218 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 123; see Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2143
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“In the end, there isn’t a single policy decision concerning preAct offenders on which Congress even tried to speak . . . .”).
219 Act of May 26, 1790, § 1.
220 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2018). Arguably, the Treasury Secretary had greater
discretion under the Remission Act than the Attorney General does under SORNA, in that
the Secretary himself had the power to decide who qualified for remission in the first place,
limited only by the capacious “intention of fraud” standard in the Remission Act. See 6
ANNALS OF CONG. 2291 (1797) (statement of Rep. Livingston) (critiquing the Remission
Act for giving the Treasury Secretary unreviewable authority to decide whether a violation
was committed with fraudulent intent or not). In contrast, the Attorney General cannot
decide for himself whether someone was convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment.
221 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also Rappaport, supra note
44, at 317–18 (arguing that “permissive” appropriations violate the nondelegation
doctrine).
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qualifier, Justice Gorsuch rejected the argument that a similarly vague
limitation would render SORNA’s delegation permissible. 222
To be sure, SORNA and the Remission Act are not identical.223
But the nondelegation “alarms” that Justice Gorsuch thinks SORNA
rings so loudly are likewise audible from the Remission Act. 224 As in
2006, in 1790 Congress effectively gave a cabinet officer with important
law enforcement responsibility “the power to write a criminal code rife
with his own policy choices.” 225 In other words, the First Congress
delegated to the Treasury Secretary authority analogous to a modern
power that at least three Justices of the current Supreme Court believe
contravenes the Founding-era understanding of nondelegation.
III.

JUSTIFYING DELEGATION

So, how might a modern nondelegationist explain the Remission
Act? The scholarly literature on delegation reveals several possibilities.
One is that Congress did not actually grant the Secretary legislative
authority, or at least not legislative authority that only Congress can
exercise. Instead, it gave him a form of judicial power, or it merely
confirmed a power the executive branch already permissibly exercised
(albeit in different form than previously). 226 A second possibility is that
the Remission Act was a delegation of legislative authority, but a
permissible one—because it fell into one of the several “exceptions” to
a constitutional prohibition on delegation that nondelegationists have
advanced to explain early congressional practice. 227
As this Part demonstrates, none of these explanations are
satisfactory. Remission certainly bears a resemblance to exercises of
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222 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Gundy
plurality’s inferred statutory command to register pre-Act offenders “to the maximum
extent feasible” had “many possible meanings,” and thus left the Attorney General “free to
make all the important policy decisions” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 903(d)(1))); cf. Lawson, supra
note 14, at 340 (describing a hypothetical statutory command to “promote goodness and
niceness” as being “so vacuous that any attempt to implement this law would amount to
creation of a new law”).
223 One difference is that the Remission Act delegated authority over penalties, while
SORNA grants discretion regarding substantive liability (i.e., the registration requirements
applicable to pre-SORNA offenders). But nothing in Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy opinion
suggests that a delegation of authority to rewrite the penalties that attach to a statutory
violation would be constitutionally permissible. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144–45 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (“To allow the nation’s chief law enforcement officer to write the criminal
laws he is charged with enforcing . . . would be to mark the end of any meaningful
enforcement of our separation of powers . . . .”).
224 Id. at 2144.
225 Id.
226 See infra Section III.A.
227 See infra Section III.B.
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authority that we typically associate with the judicial or executive
branch (like prosecutorial discretion or pardon). And if one squints
hard enough, remission might qualify as permissible exercise of
legislative power under one exception or another. But in truth the
Remission Act does not fit comfortably into any of these categories.
More important, no one at the Founding justified remission on
these grounds. Indeed, as this Part shows, there is almost no evidence
that members of the Founding generation thought about—let alone
justified—early delegations in these terms. 228 This is a crucial point,
for if contemporaries did not distinguish between lawful and unlawful
delegations in the ways that nondelegationists assert they did, then it is
difficult (perhaps impossible) to reconcile a number of important
early delegations with a stringent original understanding of
nondelegation. In other words, the Remission Act is just one of many
Founding-era delegations that instead point to a permissive original
understanding of Congress’s authority to grant legislative power to the
executive branch.
A. Nonlegislative Power
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228 See infra Section III.B.
229 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (1797) (statement of Rep. Sitgreaves) (remission was
“a power co-existent with the revenue laws”); id. at 2287 (statement of Rep. Livingston)
(“[Remission] was a question, whether a penalty incurred ought to be remitted, as far as it
respected a particular individual; it was not, therefore, a Judicial, but a Legislative
question.”).
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One way to explain the Remission Act is to consider it as an
exercise of nonlegislative power. Depending on how one frames what
the Remission Act authorized the Treasury Secretary to do, he might
have been exercising either judicial or executive authority. As
explained in this subpart, remission was sufficiently different from
authority usually exercised by the judicial or executive branch that it
cannot easily be explained as belonging to either category. And, with
one passing exception, no one in Congress defended the Remission
Act’s constitutionality on the ground that it merely conferred judicial
or executive power on the Treasury Secretary. In fact, in the 1790s,
remission’s resemblance to judicial power was an argument for its
unconstitutionality.
Of course, the most important reason to doubt that remission was
an exercise of judicial or executive power is that, at the Founding, it
was almost certainly a form of legislative authority. Members of
Congress described it as such 229—indeed, that was the basis of Edward
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Livingston’s nondelegation objection. 230 In addition, both before and
after passage of the 1790 Act, remission was exercised in the first
instance by the legislature. 231 Indeed, as discussed in Part IV, Congress
repeatedly extended the Act in no small part because it wanted to
divest itself of the responsibility of deciding such petitions. 232 The
legislative power to grant relief from undeserved penalties may not
have been precisely the same power as the authority to enact
prospective legislation. 233 But if equity is now generally associated with
courts, 234 the early Congresses routinely exercised this sort of
authority—primarily through the petitioning process. 235 Whether they
supported the Act or opposed it, members of Congress recognized that
they had “transferred” to the Secretary their collective authority to
adjust statutory penalties in individual cases as they saw fit. 236
1. Judicial Power
Nevertheless, maybe the Remission Act passed constitutional
muster because it transferred something akin to judicial power to the
executive. After all, the Act required the Treasury Secretary to apply a
legal standard set by Congress to particular facts: before granting
remission, the Secretary had to conclude that the statutory violation at
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230 See id. at 2285 (statement of Rep. Livingston) (“He believed the power they were
about to give to the Secretary of the Treasury was lodged in them, and that they had no
right to delegate it to another.”).
231 See supra Section II.B. The fact that remission was exercised by Congress in the first
instance does not conclusively establish that it was a “legislative power.” See Julian Davis
Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
1169, 1235, 1237–38, 1244 (2019) (arguing that, at the Founding, “executive power”
referred to “a conceptual power” of executing the laws, not the suite of authorities
exercised by the executive branch as an institution (emphasis omitted)). But that fact
certainly suggests that the Founding generation understood remission to be an exercise of
legislative authority.
232 See infra Section IV.A.
233 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames) (likening remission
to a sort of “chancery power”).
234 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176–
77 (1989) (describing equity’s deviation from the “general rule of law” as the province of
the courts).
235 See Blackhawk, supra note 155, at 2043 (describing “equity outside the courts” as a
dynamic process “that has long been integral to American lawmaking”); McKinley, supra
note 153, at 1576–78, 1601–02 (describing how until the mid-twentieth century, “private
bills” passed by Congress were a primary “means of resolving petitions for private claims”).
236 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (1797) (statement of Rep. Livingston); see also id. at 2286
(statement of Rep. Ames) (noting the “delicate power” of remission was “better placed in
one of our Executive Officers . . . than that House should exercise it”).
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issue occurred “without wilful negligence or any intention of fraud.” 237
In addition, the Act granted the Secretary discretion in imposing a
penalty for lawbreaking, a power the federal courts traditionally
enjoyed 238 (at least until the advent of the federal sentencing
guidelines).239 Moreover, in practice the early remission process was
an alternative forum to the courts for determining what penalties
would attach to violations of the customs laws. 240 This resemblance is
perhaps why two members of Congress suggested in 1790 that the Act
granted “judiciary powers” to executive branch officials.241
There is no indication that this similarity is what persuaded the
early Congress that the Remission Act was constitutionally permissible.
Indeed, for the 1790 critics, bestowing “judiciary powers” on executive
branch officials rendered remission unconstitutional. 242 The fact that
the Act nevertheless passed—repeatedly—suggests that members of
Congress did not believe that remission was judicial power. For good
reason. Notably, remission could operate before or after judgment in
federal district court. 243 In addition, the Treasury Secretary did not
decide liability. As the Supreme Court explained in 1825, the Act
“presuppose[d]” that the petitioner had committed the offense in
question, and merely provided an avenue for relief for inadvertent
violations. 244 This is likely why the Act’s fiercest critic, Edward
Livingston, rejected the analogy to judicial power in 1797, and the
possibility never again seemed to trouble the early Congress.245
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237 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 123. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280 (1856) (stating that any
administrative duty involving the application of law to fact can be understood as “a judicial
act”). Some nondelegationists suggest that applying law to fact may also be an executive
act. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 755; Lawson, supra note 14, at 364. And at the Founding
the distinction between executive and judicial power was somewhat unclear. See Mortenson,
supra note 231, at 1238 (discussing Founding-era “uncertainty about whether to classify
judicial power as a distinct authority or as a subset of executive power”).
238 See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1553 n.348 (stating that the Treasury Secretary’s power
under the Remission Act “is strikingly similar to the power of judges to impose fines or
sentences within the range left by law”).
239 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366–68 (1989) (discussing the advent
of the Sentencing Guidelines).
240 See Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1485–86. For example, claimants defending against a
government forfeiture suit filed a remission petition with the court, which stayed its
proceedings until the Treasury Secretary ruled on the petition. Id. And the remission
process itself had some of the trappings of proceedings in court. Id.
241 See infra note 173.
242 See id.
243 United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 287 (1825); Power of the Exec. to
Remit Forfeitures., 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 573, 574 (1847).
244 Morris, 23 U.S. at 291.
245 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (1797) (statement of Rep. Livingston) (concluding
that the power granted to the Treasury Secretary was “not . . . of a judicial nature”).
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Even if remission did not partake of “judicial power,” perhaps its
adjudicatory qualities can explain why the Act did not offend
nondelegation principles. In Gundy, Justice Gorsuch characterized
nondelegation as a constitutional prohibition on delegations of power
to establish “generally applicable rules . . . governing future
actions.” 246 Presumably what Justice Gorsuch had in mind is the sort
of formal rulemaking authority one associates with modern
administrative agencies—the kind of authority at issue in Gundy
itself. 247 In contrast, remission decisions were individualized and
retrospective. So even if the Treasury Secretary’s remission power
derived from Congress, perhaps the Constitution permits delegation
of case-by-case adjudicatory authority.
A distinction between adjudication and rulemaking cannot be
what spared the Remission Act from invalidation on nondelegation
grounds. For starters, the Secretaries’ remission decisions operated as
a form of “adjudicatory precedent” that shaped the future conduct of
the government and private parties. 248 The Secretaries applied general
rules across cases, 249 and appeared to treat past decisions as precedent
to follow when ruling on future petitions. 250 Remission decisions were
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246 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see
also Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 70 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (arguing an originalist reading of the Constitution prohibits Congress
from giving the executive branch “the discretion to formulate generally applicable rules of
private conduct”). But see Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 294–95 (arguing that the
“standard understanding of legislative power” at the Founding was much broader than
Gorsuch’s formulation).
247 See 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (granting the Attorney General “to prescribe rules for . . .
registration”).
248 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (administrative agencies have
the choice to establish rules “by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation”); Peter L.
Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1473 (1992) (saying “adjudicatory
precedent” establishes principles “to which the public may be held unless the agency is
persuaded not to apply it”). For a recent overview of the variety of forms of administrative
agency adjudication, see generally Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New
World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141 (2019).
249 For example, even when granting complete remission, the Secretaries withheld a
small portion of the penalty to cover court costs, except in rare cases of “great hardship.”
Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury, to Josiah Quincy, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Fines, Penalties, & Forfeitures (Feb. 12, 1812), in 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 1286
(1813). In other words, the Secretaries adopted and consistently applied a rule—
mandatory payment of court costs, except in hardship cases—that was not in the Remission
Act itself.
250 When he went to western Pennsylvania in 1794 to help put down the Whiskey
Rebellion, Hamilton worried that there was not enough time to explain to his deputy “the
principles which have governed [remission] in the past.” So he told the deputy to decide
difficult cases by “consulting the most recent precedents.” From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver
Wolcott, Junior, 29 September 1794, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander
Hamilton) (Sept. 29, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-17-
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not formally made public, but it appears that members of the
merchant community learned about them, and shaped their behavior
accordingly. 251 The guidance that the Secretaries and the public took
from past decisions may not have been administrative “rules” in the
modern sense—binding regulations subject to the notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. 252 But they
were general and they did operate prospectively.
More importantly, a deficit of typical rule-like qualities cannot be
what spares the Remission Act from scrutiny on nondelegation
grounds. Whether by formal regulations or individual determinations,
the Treasury Secretary regulated private conduct based on nothing
more than his opinion about what quantum of penalty a petitioner
should pay. 253 If anything, the case-by-case exercise of executive
branch power to alter legislatively prescribed penalties should be more
troubling than the power to adjust them prospectively via general rules
(as with SORNA). The latter, at least, provides “fair warning” to
regulated parties regarding the legal consequences of their conduct. 254
This may be why a nondelegationist like Justice Thomas believes that
“ad hoc” executive decisions “based on a policy judgment” violate the
nondelegation doctrine as much as prospective regulations, 255 and why
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02-0263 [https://perma.cc/7GFF-3RJL]; see also id. (noting the “course of policy” Hamilton
had taken with respect to remissions).
251 See Arlyck, supra note 26, at 1511–12 (discussing merchants’ knowledge of
Hamilton’s generous approach to granting remissions).
252 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). This formulation vastly oversimplifies the ways in which
administrative agencies can articulate “rules” governing private conduct. See Strauss, supra
note 248, at 1466–69 (describing four types of administrative rulemaking, not all of which
involve notice-and-comment).
253 Cf. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(critiquing SORNA giving the Attorney General “the power to write a criminal code rife
with his own policy choices”).
254 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964); see also Eric A. Posner, Balanceof-Powers Arguments, the Structural Constitution, and the Problem of Executive “Underenforcement,”
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1677, 1712 (2016) (“Categorical pronouncements have frequently been
used to direct executive branch subordinates, and they provide greater transparency,
predictability, and guidance than case-by-case delegation does.”).
255 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 80 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Nondelegationist scholars seem to agree. For example, the
Patent Act of 1790 gave the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney
General the power to grant patents to any new invention those officers deemed “sufficiently
useful or important.” See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 339 (quoting Act of Apr. 10,
1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110); see generally infra Section IV.B (discussing the Patent Act).
Nondelegationists have tried to justify this broad delegation of authority, but not on the
basis of its adjudicatory nature. See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1549 (arguing that the Patent
Act was consistent with nondelegation principles because it “surely addressed most” of the
important issues the Act implicated); Gordon, supra note 8, at 795–98 (arguing
(incorrectly) that the Act was modified in response to nondelegation objections).
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James Madison raised nondelegation objections to the 1798 Alien Act’s
grant of adjudicatory authority to the President. 256 However much
remission resembled an exercise of judicial authority, that cannot be
the reason it survived constitutional scrutiny.
2. Executive Power
If an analogy to judicial authority does not do the trick, maybe the
Remission Act passed constitutional muster because of its similarity to
executive authority. Remission looks like prosecutorial discretion or the
pardon power—executive acts that affect legal liability but have never
been thought to violate nondelegation principles. In that sense, the
remission power might be what Ilan Wurman describes as a
“nonexclusive” legislative power—one that Congress can exercise itself
or can delegate to the executive branch, 257 because it is akin to other
powers the Constitution vests in the executive branch. 258
These explanations for the Remission Act also fail, as remission
was different from both prosecutorial discretion and the pardon power
in meaningful ways. Take the former. As Gary Lawson has suggested,
remission looks a lot like executive authority not to seek penalties for
lawbreaking. 259 Though the timing is different, the effect is functionally the same. And as discussed below, 260 there is evidence suggesting
that some members of Congress saw the Remission Act as a means of
centralizing law enforcement discretion in a single person, rather than
allowing front-line officers to use it in potentially inconsistent or
corrupt ways. 261 In fact, the Act itself expressly granted the Treasury
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256 The Alien Act of 1798 empowered the president to deport individual aliens “he
shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.” Alien Enemy Act, ch.
58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798). Madison argued that the statute was unconstitutional in
part because it lacked “any precise rules” cabining the president’s discretion. The Report of
1800, [7 January] 1800, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (James Madison) (Jan. 7,
1800),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0202
[https://
perma.cc/DK6P-A7X5].
257 See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1532–50 (discussing the distinction between exclusive
and nonexclusive legislative powers). I address Wurman’s distinction in subsection III.B.3,
infra.
258 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting the President the power “to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985) (“[T]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict [is] a
decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch,
inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
259 Lawson, supra note 14, at 401; see also Wurman, supra note 8, at 1553–54 n.348
(describing remission as a “kind of prosecutorial discretion”).
260 See infra Section IV.A.
261 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames) (giving the Secretary
authority to relax application of strict rules was preferable to making them “loosely” and
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Secretary the power both to remit penalties incurred and to
“discontinue[]” prosecutions. 262 Perhaps remission therefore poses
no delegation problem because it was, as Lawson argues, merely “a
routine part of the executive function.”263
Or consider another possibility—that remission was simply an
instantiation of the pardon power. 264 This theory also has intuitive
appeal, given that remission operated as a form of forgiveness for legal
liability already “incurred” (though not yet formally adjudicated). 265
Perhaps this is why Joseph Story, in his famous Commentaries of 1833,
stated in passing that “remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures”
was “included” in the pardon power, whether exercised by the
President directly or granted to the Treasury Secretary by statute. 266
Story wrote more than four decades after Ratification, but perhaps his
intuition was correct.
If the Remission Act merely affirmed a power the Constitution
already conferred on the executive branch, one imagines the Act’s
Founding-era defenders would have made that argument in response
to constitutional doubts. With one exception, they did not. 267 As
discussed in Part IV, remission proponents justified the Act on
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giving “considerable discretion to the officers in the[ir] execution”); id. at 2291 (statement
of Rep. Coit) (“It was made the duty of officers to prosecute in all cases, and it was necessary,
therefore, in some to remit the fines.”). Hamilton made the connection explicit in
instructions he sent to the customs collectors: customs officers had a “duty” to enforce the
penalties for violations; the “powers of mitigation and remission”—i.e., his power under the
Remission Act—would be the means by which allowances could be made for innocent
mistakes. Treasury Department Circular, supra note 168.
262 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 123.
263 Lawson, supra note 14, at 401; see also Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 450
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“giv[ing] the Attorney General the power to reduce
congressionally imposed requirements” would not pose a nondelegation question because
“such a power is little more than a formalized version of the time-honored practice of
prosecutorial discretion” (emphasis omitted)).
264 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 793 (making this argument).
265 See United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 291 (1825) (the Remission Act
“presupposes[] that the offence has been committed,” and simply “affords relief for . . .
unintentional error”).
266 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
353–54 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833); see also WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 177 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 2d
ed.1829) (1825) (“The remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, under the revenue
laws, is included in [the pardon power].”).
267 At one point in the 1797 debate, the Act’s most vocal proponent, Fisher Ames,
described remission as “Executive business,” not “Legislative,” 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286
(1797) (statement of Rep. Ames), and later speculated that remission was perhaps a form
of “chancery power.” Id. at 2288 (statement of Rep. Ames). But he did not pursue such
arguments, and focused his defense on functional considerations instead. Id.
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functional grounds. 268 In fact, for Edward Livingston, an analogy
between remission and the pardon power created constitutional
difficulties. 269 This may be why Congress in 1791 expressly disclaimed
that remission affected the President’s pardon power. 270 It is possible
that the members of Congress who consistently voted in favor of
remission did so because they secretly thought it was a power the
executive branch already enjoyed. But the historical record gives us
no indication this was so.
There is a better explanation for why no one at the Founding
justified remission as an aspect of enforcement discretion or the
pardon power: remission was different from both. For example, under
the Remission Act, the Secretary could remit an entire forfeiture or fine,
including the half share to which customs officers were statutorily
entitled. That was something that contemporaries agreed the President could not do via pardon, 271 likely because pardons could not
infringe on private rights vested by statute. 272 As a result, if Joseph
Story was suggesting that remission derived from the pardon power, he
was simply wrong.
Remission also does not fit comfortably under the rubric of
prosecutorial or enforcement discretion. First, such discretion is
limited by the policy choices Congress has already made. Modern
prosecutors can choose from a limited menu of charging options, or
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268 See infra Section IV.A.
269 In the 1797 debates Livingston complained that remission effectively gave the
Treasury Secretary the power to pardon crimes. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2290 (1797)
(statement of Rep. Livingston). As others observed, the Constitution reserved this power
for the President alone. See id. at 2292 (statement of Rep. Nicholas).
270 See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 24, § 3, 1 Stat. 218, 218 (“[N]othing in the said act shall
be construed to limit or restrain the power of the President of the United States, to grant
pardons for offences against the United States.”).
271 See To Alexander Hamilton from Richard Harison, 24 May 1791, NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE (Richard Harison) (May 24, 1791), https://founders.archives.gov
/documents/Hamilton/01-08-02-0326 [https://perma.cc/S3LM-9SLV].
Though the
author of this opinion was not “assured” that he was correct, id., the Washington
Administration adhered to his view. See To George Washington from Alexander Hamilton, 9 June
1794, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton) (June 9, 1794), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0167 [https://perma.cc/CC7ZU8AY] (recommending a pardon for a customs infraction, “which would operate to remit
one half the penalty incurred”). So did later administrations. See, e.g., Power of the Exec.
to Remit Forfeitures, supra note 243, at 576–77 (unlike remission, the pardon power does
not extend to officer’s share of a forfeiture).
272 See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 568
(2007) (discussing the nineteenth century view that a pardon cannot “release and acquit . . .
private rights” (alteration in original) (quoting Passenger Laws.—Pardoning Power, 6 Op.
Att’y Gen. 393, 403 (1854)).
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they can decide not to charge at all. 273 But they cannot invent new
prohibitions and penalties, and then impose them.274 In contrast, the
remission power gave the Treasury Secretary discretion to decide what
penalty was “reasonable and just,” subject only to a statutory cap that
was often quite high. 275 The Secretary did not simply choose among
fixed legislative options; he made a policy decision about what
punishment fit the crime. 276 This distinction between a limited menu
and a blank check is important, as it may be what reconciles a strong
version of nondelegation with historical toleration of executive
enforcement discretion. It is the delegated power to make rules, rather
than simply choose among them, that supposedly offends
nondelegation principles. 277
Second, unlike garden-variety enforcement discretion, remission
was apparently binding on the government. Ordinarily, a prosecutorial choice not to enforce the law does not bar later enforcement for
the same violation (perhaps by a successor administration).278 In
contrast, a grant of remission seems to have permanently foreclosed
the government’s ability to impose a penalty for the violation in
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273 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“[W]hat charge to file or
bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).
274 The same is arguably not true for enforcement discretion’s cousin, settlement
authority. At least when it comes to civil penalties, the government and the defendants can
agree to any punishment within statutory and regulatory limits. See, e.g., Joseph A.
Grundfest, Fair or Foul?: SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform Through
Removal Legislation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1181 (2016) (“The vast majority of SEC
enforcement actions . . . are settled simultaneously with the initiation of the action.”). And
government agencies can seek and impose such penalties via administrative proceedings,
rather than in court. See id. at 1145 (discussing SEC administrative proceedings). Of
course, originalist-minded critics of the administrative state are no more comfortable with
this state of affairs than they are with a permissive nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g.,
HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 227 (“[A]dministrative adjudication dangerously restores an
extralegal judicial regime.”).
275 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 123.
276 Notably, the early Congress knew how to limit the Treasury Secretary’s discretion
when it wanted. See Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 33, § 1, 2 Stat. 804, 805 (“direct[ing]” the
Secretary to remit “all fines, penalties, and forfeitures” incurred under various embargo
acts, if the imported goods were American property and properly reported).
277 Gary Lawson suggests as much. In his view, “[t]he executive department always has
prosecutorial discretion to decide . . . what levels and kinds of statutorily-permitted penalties
to seek.” Lawson, supra note 14, at 401 (emphasis added); see also Reynolds v. United States,
565 U.S. 432, 448–50 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that a hypothetical version of
SORNA that imposed all registration requirements on pre-Act offenders but granted the
Attorney General discretion to make case-by-case exceptions would be acceptable as “a
formalized version of the time-honored practice of prosecutorial discretion”).
278 In certain cases, nonenforcement effectively will be made permanent through the
operation of an outside force—for example, if the statute of limitations runs in the interim,
or if the government pledges not to enforce the law against someone in the future through
a nonprosecution agreement.
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question. 279 This distinction also seems important, at least for
nondelegationists who suggest that enforcement discretion is
constitutionally tolerable because it does not alter the regulated party’s
underlying legal liability.280 Accordingly, the Remission Act should
trouble nondelegationists even if they think ordinary enforcement
discretion poses no constitutional problem. 281 At minimum, there is
little evidence that remission’s resemblance to familiar forms of
executive power is what spared it from constitutional objection at the
Founding.
B. Permissible Delegation of Legislative Power
Perhaps instead of viewing remission as a nonlegislative power, we
can understand it as a legislative power that Congress could delegate,
because it qualified under one of several “exceptions” to
nondelegation principles. To be clear, there is no record of anyone in
the Founding era suggesting that remission was justifiable on such
grounds, and no nondelegationist argues that now. But the idea is
worth exploring nonetheless, for an assessment of the Remission Act
offers an opportunity to interrogate these exceptions more broadly. If
they are a modern invention—as the historical evidence strongly
suggests—then several additional Founding-era statutes also cannot be
reconciled with a stringent version of the nondelegation doctrine.
1. Foreign Affairs
It is common currency among nondelegationists that there was an
exception to nondelegation for grants of discretionary authority
touching on military and foreign affairs. 282 There is a good reason for
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279 See The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 722 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9072) (Story, J.)
(noting the Secretary’s grant of remission “is conclusive, and cannot be overhaled in any
collateral inquiry”). I am aware of no case in which a grant of remission by the Treasury
Secretary was subsequently reversed or modified.
280 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 808–09 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is
consistent with nondelegation because the executive branch’s decision not to enforce the
law does not shield the lawbreaker from future prosecution by a different administration,
or from collateral consequences of the violation, such as civil suit by a private party under
a private right of action); HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 122 (noting that a prosecutor’s
decision to forbear does not shield the violator from other consequences (including civil),
whereas administrative waiver—which Hamburger thinks is unlawful—“relieve[s] persons
from the obligation of the law itself”).
281 See HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 123 (“[P]rosecutorial discretion . . . may be
worrisome, but [administrative] waivers are much worse.”).
282 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
Gordon, supra note 8, at 782; Rappaport, supra note 44, at 352–54; David Schoenbrod, The
Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1260 (1985); cf.
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this enthusiasm. Without such an exception, it is difficult—perhaps
impossible—to explain several significant Founding-era delegations of
legislative authority to the executive branch. 283
Accordingly,
nondelegationists have invoked this exception to justify exceptionally
broad grants of authority regarding restrictions on foreign
commerce 284 and trade with Native peoples. 285 Such an exception
might also justify early statutes that nondelegationists have not directly
addressed, such as those involving military build-ups 286 and
enforcement of quarantines against foreign vessels. 287
The argument in favor of a “foreign affairs exception” to
nondelegation is seductive. Article II of the Constitution grants the
President substantial authority in war and foreign relations, so
delegations in those areas can be understood as “already within the
scope of executive power.” 288 In other words, statutes giving the
executive broad discretion in military and foreign relations are not
really delegations of legislative authority. They merely confirm power
the executive already enjoys under the Constitution (if perhaps shared
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HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 105 (statutory licensing regimes the Founders used for “crossborder or offshore problems” did not contravene the nondelegation principle).
283 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (early nineteenth-century
embargo statute can be explained as “permissible [executive] lawmaking” in the area of
foreign affairs); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 80 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (observing 1794 embargo statute did not violate
nondelegation principles because it “involved the external relations of the United States”);
Cass, supra note 14, at 157 (“Outside the realm of foreign affairs . . . [Congress] did not
authorize the President or the courts or other governmental officers to adopt rules that
broadly regulated behavior of private individuals . . . .”); Gordon, supra note 8, at 784–85
(a foreign affairs exception is the best way to “harmonize” several early delegations with a
robust nondelegation doctrine); Rappaport, supra note 44, at 352–54 (“tentative[ly]”
suggesting that early delegations to the executive in military and foreign affairs can be
explained as an “exception” justified by constitutional structure and purpose).
284 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 784 & n.219 (citing Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat.
372; Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 444; Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 53, § 5, 1 Stat. 566; Act
of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, § 4, 1 Stat. 613, 615).
285 See Lawson, supra note 14, at 397, 401–02 (citing Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 1, 1
Stat. 137, 137); Rappaport, supra note 44, at 354 (same); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1543
(same statute can be explained by reference to “the President’s Treaty and Commander-inChief powers”).
286 See Act of Mar. 17, 1791, ch. 28, § 8, 1 Stat. 222, 223; Act of Mar. 5, 1792, ch. 9, §§ 2,
3, 1 Stat. 241, 241–42; Act of Nov. 29, 1794, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 403, 403; Act of May 28, 1798,
ch. 47, § 3, 1 Stat. 558, 558. Wurman and Gordon both recognize that the 1798 Act was
passed despite nondelegation challenges, but do not argue that this was due to the existence
of a military or foreign affairs exception. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 749–50; Wurman,
supra note 8, at 1515.
287 See Act of May 27, 1796, ch, 31, 1 Stat. 474.
288 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Schoenbrod, supra note
282, at 1260).
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with Congress). 289 The argument has obvious flaws—most notably, the
early statutes nondelegationists seek to explain all involve powers the
Constitution expressly grants to Congress, not to the President. 290 But
if we allow that, broadly speaking, military and foreign relations are
areas of “overlap[ping]” legislative and executive authority, a carve-out
for delegations in this area makes some intuitive sense. 291
A Founding-era nondelegation exception for military and foreign
affairs cannot explain the Remission Act, for two reasons. First, it is
difficult to categorize the Secretary’s power as one concerning military
and foreign affairs. It was a power related to foreign commerce, in that
the customs laws regulated imports. But the Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce, not the
President. 292 In addition, the early remission power extended to
penalties incurred for purely domestic infractions. For example, the
Secretary could remit penalties for violations of statutes regulating the
“coasting trade” 293—i.e., trade within United States waters—and
statutes prescribing domestic excise taxes on spirits. 294
Second, and more important, a foreign affairs exception to
nondelegation simply did not exist at the Founding. 295 The limited
evidence nondelegationists cite is actually no support at all. For
example, nondelegationists rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s
statement in United States v. Curtiss-Wright that delegations of discretion
are more permissible with respect to foreign affairs.296 Decided in
1936, Curtiss-Wright itself is not evidence of a Founding-era foreign
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289 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (saying the
President does not need an act of Congress to act “as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations”).
290 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 12 (granting Congress power to “raise and support
Armies” and “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . . and with the Indian Tribes”).
291 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
292 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Mortenson, supra note 231, at 1174 (arguing that as
an originalist matter, the Vesting Clause of Article II does not give the President “a freefloating and indefeasible foreign affairs power”).
293 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122.
294 See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 43, 1 Stat. 199, 209.
295 See Note, supra note 20, at 1140 (“No one [at the Founding] suggested th[at]
delegations were permissible solely by virtue of their foreign affairs subject matter.”).
296 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(“[C]ongressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry
within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved.”); see also Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 n.42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing
Curtiss-Wright as support for foreign relation exception, 299 U.S. at 320); Dep’t of Transp.
v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 80 n.5 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(same).
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affairs exception. 297 In upholding a 1934 congressional resolution
granting the President the power to ban certain arms sales, the Court
discussed Founding-era statutes granting the President broad authority
to enact or rescind restrictions on foreign commerce related to armed
conflict. 298 In light of this “unbroken legislative practice,” the Court
had little trouble concluding that the 1934 provision was
constitutional. 299 But the fact that a number of early statutes were
consistent with a supposed foreign affairs exception does not make such
enactments evidence of such an exception. There is no historical
evidence suggesting that such statutes would have been prohibited but
for their connection to foreign affairs, and their existence is entirely
consistent with a permissive Founding-era understanding of
nondelegation generally. 300
The other evidence cited by nondelegationists is no more
probative of a foreign affairs exception. A 1790 statement by a member
of Congress, 301 an 1803 treatise passage, 302 and an 1808 district court


12/21/2021 11:58:47

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 150 Side A

297 There is also reason to believe that the Curtiss-Wright Court invented the foreign
affairs exception to justify the delegation in that case, which would otherwise have been
invalid under the Court’s nondelegation rulings the year before. See Note, supra note 20,
at 1149–51.
298 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322–24.
299 Id. at 322.
300 Indeed, Philip Hamburger concedes that several Founding-era embargo statutes
violated nondelegation principles. See HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 108–09 & n.48 (noting
1794, 1799, 1800, and 1808 statutes). Hamburger does not justify these statutes on the basis
of a foreign relations exception. Instead, he notes that Congress later granted the President
less discretionary authority, in 1809 and 1810 embargo statutes. Id. at 109 & n.51.
According to Hamburger, these later statutes demonstrate that Congress “recognized the
constitutional problem” with its earlier delegations, and fixed it. Id. at 109. But it is telling
that it took Congress fifteen years to realize that its actions were unconstitutional. And on
Hamburger’s account, Congress continued to delegate broad authority to the President to
limit foreign commerce after it had supposedly seen the errors of its ways. See id. (noting
congressional “lapse[]” in 1822, among others).
301 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 784–85. The 1790 statement arose in a debate over
whether Congress could statutorily require the President to seek the Senate’s consent when
setting compensation for American diplomatic officials out of appropriated funds. See
GAZETTE OF THE U.S., Jan. 27, 1790, as reprinted in 12 DHFFC, supra note 148, at 70, 71–72.
In other words, the discussion was not about whether Congress could more broadly grant
legislative authority to the executive when “foreign relations” were involved. It was about
whether Congress could limit the President’s Article II authority to direct U.S. diplomacy.
See id. at 72 (“[I]ntercourse with foreign nations is a trust specially committed to the
President of the United States; and after the Legislature has made the necessary provision
to enable him to discharge that trust, the manner how it shall be executed must rest with
him . . . .”).
302 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 784–85. The passage from St. George Tucker’s edition
of Blackstone’s Commentaries says nothing about delegations of legislative authority. As
Tucker makes very clear, he was discussing a 1793 controversy over whether President
Washington had improperly exercised the power to “declare War” granted to Congress, see
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opinion are not actually about delegation. 303 An 1829 treatise
passage—published forty years after Ratification—does suggest that
Congress can more broadly delegate in the realm of foreign affairs. 304
But the writer extrapolated this principle from a single 1813 decision
of the Supreme Court that did not discuss a foreign relations exception
to nondelegation; indeed, the opinion did not directly address
delegation at all.305
Just as importantly, there is also strong evidence against a foreign
affairs exception to nondelegation. On multiple occasions in the first
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, when he announced that the United States would remain
neutral in the growing war between France and Great Britain. See 1 St. George Tucker,
Appendix to BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 346–47 & n.‡ (Philadelphia, William Young
Birch, & Abraham Small 1803). This dispute was not about delegation, as Congress had
not legislated at all, let alone purported to grant the president the power to declare war.
303 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 784–85. The 1808 opinion regarding the
constitutionality of the Jeffersonian embargo was not about whether Congress could
permissibly delegate authority to the President to suspend the embargo. The court
mentioned the President’s power to suspend the embargo only once, in passing. United
States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 622 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700). The constitutional
issue the court discussed was whether Congress had the power under Article I to institute
such broad restrictions on foreign commerce in the first place. See id. at 620–24 (“It is
contended, that congress is not invested with powers, by the constitution, to enact laws, so
general and so unlimited, relative to commercial intercourse with foreign nations, as those
now under consideration.”). The court concluded, in part, that Congress’s power to
declare war justified an “expanded range” of “legislative discretion” to restrict foreign
commerce by statute in order to avoid war. Id. at 622. The court was not suggesting that
Congress had “expanded” discretion to make delegations to the executive branch when
foreign affairs were at issue.
304 See RAWLE, supra note 266, at 196 (“Among other incidents arising from foreign
relations, it may be noticed that congress, which cannot conveniently be always in session,
may devolve on the president, duties that at first view seem to belong only to themselves.”).
305 See RAWLE, supra note 266, at 196 n.* (citing The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813)). The Aurora involved an 1810 law that empowered
the President to put an embargo on foreign commerce into effect if he determined that
France or Great Britain was violating United States neutrality by seizing American ships. See
11 U.S. at 382. The owner argued that Congress could not give the President the power to
put the embargo into effect. Id. at 386. In response, the attorney for the government
argued that Congress had not “transfer[red] any power of legislation to the President.” Id.
at 387. It had only empowered him to determine, as a factual matter, whether the warring
powers were violating United States neutrality. Id. The Court did not address the issue
directly. All it said was that it could “see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not
exercise its discretion in reviving the act . . . either expressly or conditionally, as their
judgment should direct.” Id. at 388. Nondelegationists have described The Aurora as a
“foundational” case, Bamzai, supra note 17, at 182, and suggested that it could have been
decided on the ground of a foreign relations exception. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S.
Ct. 2116, 2137 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Bamzai, supra note 17, at 182 n.118. At
best, the opinion implicitly endorses the principle that conditional legislation does not
offend nondelegation principles. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 1737 (“Nothing
in The Brig Aurora endorses the delegation metaphor . . . .”).
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two decades following Ratification, federal legislators made
nondelegation arguments against proposed legislation giving the
executive broad discretion related to military and foreign affairs. 306
For example, the 1798 Alien Act empowered the President to order
the removal of any foreign citizen he deemed “dangerous to the peace
and safety of the United States.” 307 Other proposed legislation that
year authorized him to raise an army of up to twenty thousand troops
“whenever he shall judge the public safety shall require the
measure.” 308 An 1808 law allowed the President to suspend a statutory
embargo on foreign commerce whenever he concluded that the
actions of warring European powers “render[ed] . . . the United States
sufficiently safe.” 309 An 1810 proposal would have given the President
apparently standardless authority to deploy naval ships to “protect[]
the commerce of the United States.” 310
Notably, proponents of this proposed legislation did not defend
it on grounds of a delegation exception for military and foreign affairs.
This is puzzling, to say the least. If this exception was “well-established”
at the Founding, 311 why didn’t supporters invoke it to defend these
bills’ constitutionality? 312 If it was consensus in the Founding era that
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306 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789–1801, at 186–87 (1997) (1794 bill allowing the President to decide the size of the
army); id. at 244–48 (1798 bill authorizing to the President to raise an additional volunteer
military force); HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 107–08 (1808 bill allowing the President to
suspend a statutory embargo on foreign commerce); Gordon, supra note 8, at 747–48 (1798
bill empowering the President to order the removal of aliens); id. at 748–49 (1810 bill giving
the President standardless authority to deploy naval ships to protect “the commerce of the
United States” (quoting 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022 (1810))).
307 Alien Enemy Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798); see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG.
2007–08 (1798) (statement of Rep. Livingston) (arguing the Act unconstitutionally
combined “Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers”).
308 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1525, 1631 (1798); see also id. at 1538 (statement of Rep.
Gallatin) (arguing that the bill “improper[ly] . . . vested Legislative power in the President
of the United States”); Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 359–62 (reviewing debate over
the bill).
309 Act of Apr. 22, 1808, ch. 52, 2 Stat. 490 (repealed 1809); see also 18 ANNALS OF CONG.
2125 (1808) (statement of Rep. Key) (“[W]e cannot transfer the power of legislating from
ourselves to the President . . . .”).
310 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022 (1810); see also id. (statement of Rep. J.G. Jackson) (“All
legislative power is by the Constitution vested in Congress. They cannot transfer it.”).
311 See Gordon, supra note 82 (manuscript at 33, 35).
312 As Aaron Gordon notes, see Gordon, supra note 82 (manuscript at 30), in 1808 one
member of Congress defended a grant of executive discretion in an embargo bill on the
ground that the President was better able to respond to rapidly changing conditions in
foreign commerce, though it is not clear whether the speaker was making that point to
defend the bill’s “constitutionality” or instead to highlight its “expediency.” 18 ANNALS OF
CONG. 2224, 2228–30 (1808) (statement of Rep. Findley); see also Note, supra note 20, at
1145 (“Findley’s argument was functionalist, not formalist—and concerned the regulation
of foreign commerce, not foreign affairs generally.”).
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Congress has significant latitude to delegate in the realms of military
and foreign affairs, it seems odd that members of Congress did not
think this was worth mentioning at the time.
The obvious solution to this puzzle is that such an exception to
nondelegation did not exist. Indeed, it is not all clear that Foundingera Americans would have understood “foreign affairs” to constitute a
distinct category of legislative authority in the first place. In an era
when constant international armed conflict threatened the nation’s
commerce and security (as well as providing opportunities for
American aggrandizement), concern over foreign relations impacted
virtually all “domestic” policymaking.313 The foreign affairs exception
to the nondelegation principle is almost certainly a modern
invention—either by the Curtiss-Wright Court in 1936, or by originalist
scholars seeking to explain how a Founding generation supposedly
committed to stringent limits on delegation could have repeatedly
sanctioned broad grants of authority to the executive. Perhaps a
military and foreign affairs exception to nondelegation makes sense
on structural or functional grounds. 314 But it is difficult to justify as an
originalist matter.
2. Benefits
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313 See BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL
AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 155–56 (2009) (“With borders shifting daily
and trade subjected to the whims of powerful nations that dominated the sea lanes, the
distinction between domestic and foreign policy was meaningless.”); Parrillo, supra note 7,
at 1319–20 (1798 federal land tax prompted by need to finance military preparations for
war with France).
314 Rather than relying on the President’s powers under Article II, Michael Rappaport
argues that a military and foreign affairs exception to the nondelegation doctrine makes
sense for structural reasons. See Rappaport, supra note 44, at 352–54.
315 See HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 3 n.b, 84–85.
316 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2143 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see
also Bamzai, supra note 17, at 182 (“A distinction between rights and privileges might
explain several laws enacted in early Congresses that delegated authority to the executive

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 151 Side B

Remission also cannot be explained by resort to a second
exceptional category nondelegationists identify: one for delegations
relating to government privileges and benefits. Under this theory, a
legislative delegation is unconstitutional only when the rules issued by
the executive pursuant to the delegation “bind” or “constrain”
individuals. Rules that merely regulate the provision of privileges and
benefits do not have such “binding” force, and therefore can lawfully
be created by the executive. 315 Justice Gorsuch appeared to subscribe
to this theory in Gundy, as he deemed unconstitutional most executiveissued rules “governing private conduct.” 316 Here, too, there is good
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reason for nondelegationists to theorize such an exception, as a
constraints/benefits distinction helps make sense of several early
federal statutes that otherwise appear to violate nondelegation
principles. 317
As an originalist explanation for the Remission Act, this theory
suffers from similar flaws as the foreign relations exception. First,
leaving aside the fact that no one in Congress justified the Act on the
ground that it merely provided a benefit, it seems doubtful whether
such an exception actually existed. Its modern proponents cite no
Founding-era evidence suggesting the existence of such an
exception. 318 And again, early legislation that seemingly would have
qualified as regulating “benefits” was attacked by opponents on
nondelegation grounds. 319 For example, in a 1791 episode often cited
by nondelegationists as evidence of a robust Founding-era principle, 320
James Madison and others criticized as unconstitutional a proposal
that would have given the President broad discretion to designate
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branch . . . .”); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1548–49 (“Perhaps Congress had more power to
delegate authority to establish public privileges.”).
317 See HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 86 (1790 act empowering the President to set rates
for military pensions); Bamzai, supra note 17, at 182 (1790 act allowing executive branch to
license and regulate trade with Indian tribes); id. (1790 act authorizing executive officials
to issue patents); Postell & Moreno, supra note 44, at 47 (asserting that most Founding-era
delegations resulted in executive regulations that “did not . . . bind” the public (quoting
HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 87)). Not all nondelegationists fully subscribe to the
constraints/benefits distinction. See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1548–49 (noting a distinction
between private rights and public privileges “cannot be dispositive,” though Congress might
have “some additional leeway” to delegate when privileges are at issue); Rappaport, supra
note 44, at 356–57 (nonmilitary benefits statutes are subject to the nondelegation doctrine).
Accordingly, they justify the early “benefits” statutes on different grounds. See, e.g.,
Wurman, supra note 8, at 1534 (arguing that 1790 military pensions statute actually
delegated little authority to the executive); id. at 1543 (suggesting that 1790 statute
governing trade with Native peoples was “a delegation in the context of the President’s
Treaty and Commander-in-Chief Powers”); Gordon, supra note 8, at 795–98 (asserting that
Congress in 1793 significantly circumscribed the executive branch’s discretion in granting
patents).
318 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 83 n.7 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (discussing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911));
HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 3 n.b, 84–85 (citing only John Locke and Edward Coke);
Bamzai, supra note 17, at 178–82 (identifying Grimaud as “the key precedent” supporting a
rights/privilege distinction for nondelegation). The one potential exception, noted by
Wurman, came from James Madison in 1800. See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1555. He
suggested that a law that invaded “personal liberty” would require greater “details,
definitions, and rules” to avoid merging the “appropriate powers of the distinct
departments.” The Report of 1800, supra note 256.
319 Parrillo, supra note 20 (manuscript at 19–20).
320 See Lawson, supra note 14, at 402–03; JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA:
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 75–77
(2017); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1506–12.
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“post roads” along which the mails would run. 321 If there had been a
consensus view that Congress could broadly delegate legislative
authority to the executive when “benefits” were at issue, Madison’s
nondelegation critique would have been pointless. And the proposal’s
supporters would likely have invoked the exception, instead of
defending the proposal on the ground they actually did—that
Congress generally had the authority to make such an expansive
delegation. 322
Moreover, even if a benefits exception did exist at the Founding,
the Remission Act is an awkward fit. Formally, it might make sense;
the Act assumed that a penalty has already been “incurred,” 323 so one
can view remission granted by the Treasury Secretary as merely
bestowing upon the petitioner a government “benefit” to which he
had no legal right. 324 But that is not how remission worked in the real
world. As described above, the remission mechanism was effectively an
alternative, executive branch procedure for assigning penalties for
customs violations.325 When someone filed a petition seeking
remission, no actual penalty was decided upon or imposed until the
Treasury Secretary made his decision.
The difficulty of cleanly categorizing remission as a “benefit” also
illustrates the larger problem with the constraint/benefit distinction.
As its leading proponent, Philip Hamburger, acknowledges, some
denials of benefits “operate in the manner of a constraint,” and should
be treated as such for constitutional purposes. 326 Though Hamburger
does not offer a way of distinguishing “pure” benefits from “benefitsas-constraints,” it seems safe to assume that a benefit that was, in reality,
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321 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 349–56. I discuss the “post roads debate” at
greater length in Section IV.B.
322 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 232 (1791) (statement of Rep. B. Bourne) (“The
Constitution meant no more than that Congress should possess the exclusive right of doing
that, by themselves or by any other person, which amounts to the same thing.”).
323 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 123; see also United States v. Morris, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 291 (1825) (saying the Remission Act “presupposes[] that the offence
has been committed,” and simply “affords relief for . . . unintentional error”).
324 Cf. Gordon, supra note 82, at 38 n.234 (arguing that the Act was “justifiable . . .
because it merely conferred upon the Secretary the power to return specified sums of
government money . . . .”).
325 See supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text.
326 HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 3 n.b (first citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); and then citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); see also Harold J. Krent,
Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 732 (1994) (book review) (noting the
“difficulty” of distinguishing “rules of private conduct from those merely affecting or
encouraging private conduct”).
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a penalty imposed for violating the law would count as a
“constraint.” 327
Accordingly, the Remission Act should have run afoul of the
Founding-era nondelegation doctrine that Hamburger and others
espouse. But it did not. Nor did other examples of Founding-era
“benefits” legislation that delegated broad policymaking power to the
executive. For example, a 1790 statute gave the President unfettered
authority to prescribe regulations governing licenses given to persons
who wanted to trade with Native peoples. 328 Because such trading was
prohibited without a license, 329 the statute clearly allowed the executive
to impose “constraints.” So too with the Patent Act of 1790, which
empowered executive branch officials to issue patents granting
inventors the “exclusive right . . . [to their] discover[ies]”—i.e., the
executive could “constrain” others from engaging in conduct the
patent covered. 330 In short, on multiple occasions the early Congresses
gave the executive branch broad authority to regulate the provision of
“benefits” in ways that actually placed meaningful limits on private
conduct.
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327 Indeed, Hamburger argues that, in the English tradition, laws that “obliged”—i.e.,
that coerced—“included those that relaxed legal duties.” HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 84
(emphasis added). On his account, any executive “alteration of a legally binding duty” was
“unlawful.” Id.
328 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 137, 137.
329 Id.; see also Wurman, supra note 8, at 1543 (“This was indeed a broad statute that
delegated authority to regulate private conduct.”).
330 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (emphasis added). Hamburger
argues that patents were historically not considered “binding,” because the patent only
prevented other people from engaging in conduct the patent covered; otherwise, they
could do what they liked. HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 201–02. Of course, the fact that a
patent only partially constrained others does not make it less of a “constraint,” and
Hamburger admits that the distinction is “artificial.” Id.
The Supreme Court has recently held that patent grants involve “public rights,”
because they confer a government benefit on the patentee. See Oil States Energy Servs.,
LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (“[T]he decision to grant
a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise.”
(emphasis omitted)). The Court, however, only considered the interests of the grantee. See
id. (“By ‘issuing patents,’ the [Patent and Trademark Office] ‘take[s] from the public rights
of immense value, and bestow[s] them upon the patentee.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888)) (omitting
“the” from first quote). From the perspective of those who are constrained by a grant the
government makes to someone else, a patent clearly affects private rights. See Wurman,
supra note 8, at 1548 (noting that executive branch rules governing patent issuance under
the 1790 Patent Act “alter the rights of private persons”).
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3. Unimportance
A third possibility for explaining the Remission Act is that
Congress simply thought remission was not that important. Taking
their cue from an 1825 opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, Gary Lawson
and Ilan Wurman have suggested that Congress cannot delegate
authority over “important subjects,” but it can over matters of “less
interest.” 331 Justice Gorsuch echoed this view in Gundy, when he
allowed that the executive branch can “fill up the details” of a
regulatory scheme, as long as Congress has made the key “policy
decisions” first. 332
As a theory of nondelegation, an “important subjects” approach
makes some sense. If we assume there was some Founding-era limit on
Congress’s power to delegate legislative authority, requiring Congress
to make “important” policy decisions before delegating “details” to the
executive is at least consistent with constitutional separation of powers
principles. 333 If nothing else, an important-subjects theory of
nondelegation seems more plausible than a general prohibition on
delegation riddled with various subject-matter exceptions.
Yet this approach, too, is fraught with difficulty. The first problem
is conceptual (and obvious): “importance” is very much in the eye of
the beholder. 334 As recognized by Chief Justice Marshall and modern
scholars on all sides of the debate, distinguishing important “policy
decisions” from unimportant “details” in a principled, consistent way
is challenging, to the say the least. 335 Wurman, for example, offers no
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331 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825); see Lawson, supra note
14, at 376–77 (“Congress must make the central, fundamental decisions, but Congress can
leave ancillary matters to the President or the courts.”); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1497
(“[T]he picture the Founding-era history paints is one of a nondelegation doctrine whereby
Congress could not delegate to the Executive decisions over ‘important subjects’ . . . .”
(quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43)).
332 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43); see Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019)
(Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (“[M]ajor national policy
decisions must be made by Congress and the President in the legislative process, not
delegated by Congress to the Executive Branch.”).
333 See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1555.
334 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 287 (noting an important-subject theory
“would force courts to make subjective and contestable judgments about what counts as a
detail and what counts as something more”); cf. Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1933, 1982–1990 (2017) (critiquing on similar grounds the “major
questions” exception to Chevron deference).
335 See Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43 (“The line has not been exactly drawn which separates
those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest . . . .”); Lawson, supra note 14, at 361 (“Surely . . . the constitutionality
of legislative authorizations to executive and judicial actors cannot turn on something as
ephemeral, and ultimately circular, as a distinction between ‘important subjects’ and
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criteria for drawing such a line. 336
He suggests that the
important/unimportant dichotomy mirrors the distinction he
advances between “exclusive” and “nonexclusive” legislative powers—
i.e., Congress has “exclusive” (and nondelegable) authority to decide
important policy questions, but can give the executive the
“nonexclusive” power to specify unimportant details in a legislative
scheme. 337 But Wurman offers no more guidance in distinguishing
“exclusive” from “nonexclusive” legislative powers than he does in
separating important subjects from unimportant details. And Lawson
concedes that his approach—which relies on an analogy to the law of
agency—does not “yield a crisp line . . . between what is important and
what is of less interest.”338
The second problem is historical (and less obvious): as intuitively
appealing as the important-subjects theory may be, it does not appear
to be one to which members of the Founding generation subscribed.
The secondary literature reports no instance of nondelegation
discussed in “importance” terms before Justice Marshall’s statement in
Wayman—which he made more than three decades after
Ratification. 339 Wurman asserts that particular Founding-era delegations were “consistent” with an important-subjects theory, but does not
point to evidence that anyone at the Founding articulated such a
theory. 340 For his part, Lawson argues that an important-subjects
theory of nondelegation, grounded in agency law, is part of the
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matters of ‘less interest.’”); Wurman, supra note 8, at 1490 (“What are the important
policies that must be resolved by Congress [are] sometimes, of course, in the eye of the
beholder.”); cf. Sunstein, supra note 39, at 326–27 (“The real question is: How much
executive discretion is too much to count as ‘executive’? No metric is easily available to
answer that question.”).
336 Wurman does suggest that Congress has more latitude in delegating “important”
matters involving public rights than private rights. See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1502–03.
As discussed earlier, that distinction, too, is historically unjustified and conceptually
problematic. See supra subsection III.B.2. In any event, it offers no guidance for resolving
the first-order question of whether the matter delegated to the executive is “important” or
not.
337 Wurman, supra note 8, at 1534–35, 1538.
338 Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript at 26). In terms of concrete guidance, Lawson
advances only the “tentative” suggestion that congressional delegation may be more
permissible on questions that do not require national “uniformity,” such that “local
knowledge” available only to executive branch officials might be needed in order to fashion
policy. Id. (manuscript at 27–28).
339 During the post roads debate, one representative who voiced nondelegation
objections suggested that the establishment of post roads was “a very important object,”
though it is not clear that, in his view, the roads’ importance was what made the delegation
unconstitutional. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229, 230 (1791) (statement of Rep. Livermore); see
Wurman, supra note 8, at 1511 (noting Livermore’s statement).
340 Wurman, supra note 8, at 1538, 1540.
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Constitution’s original meaning. 341 But that proposition relies on
Lawson’s more general—and contestable—belief that the Constitution
itself was understood at the Founding to be a sort of fiduciary
instrument. 342 Accordingly, while an important subjects theory of
nondelegation might be sensible, it does not appear that anyone at the
Founding actually articulated it.
In fact, Congress’s early legislative record suggests that delegation
of important questions to the executive was entirely permissible. The
Remission Act itself is a good example. As discussed earlier, there was
broad agreement in Congress that the remission power was
“important,” in two senses: it was crucial for ensuring that innocent
lawbreakers were not subject to harsh penalties, and also had to be
employed carefully, so as not to undermine revenue collection—itself
a critical matter. 343 As Joseph Story wrote in 1815, the remission power
was understood to be “one of the most important and extensive
powers” the government possessed. 344 Little wonder that none of the
Act’s proponents justified it on grounds of unimportance.
Other examples abound. As Christine Chabot has recently shown,
in 1790 Congress granted the President broad discretion to borrow up
to $12 million dollars from foreign lenders—a sum that, as a
percentage of GDP, would be the equivalent of more than a trillion
dollars today. 345 In 1794, it authorized the President to impose a
complete embargo on foreign trade “whenever, in his opinion, the
public safety shall so require.” 346 In 1798, it enacted a real estate tax
of up to $2 million that gave executive branch officials broad latitude
to decide how the tax burden would be distributed within states. 347
The list goes on. 348
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341 See Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript at 8, 11) (“[T]he real ground for the
Constitution’s nonsubdelegation principle is the nature of the Constitution as a particular
kind of [fiduciary] legal instrument.”).
342 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”:
UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017). But see Richard Primus, The
Elephant Problem, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 373 (2019) (reviewing LAWSON & SEIDMAN,
supra) (“As a historical matter, there is virtually no evidence that the Founders thought of
the Constitution on the model of a power of attorney.”); Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller,
Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism, 106 VA. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (2020) (“[T]he historical,
philosophical, and legal foundations of fiduciary constitutionalism are weak.”).
343 See supra Section II.A.
344 The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 720–21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9072).
345 See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 2, 1 Stat. 138, 139; Chabot, supra note 8
(manuscript at 26–27) (discussing this legislation).
346 Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, § 1, 1 Stat. 372, 372; see Note, supra note 20, at 1141–42
(discussing this legislation).
347 See Parrillo, supra note 7, at 1318–26 (discussing this legislation).
348 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 332–66.
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One might argue that these delegations did not contravene an
“important subjects” theory, because Congress decided all the really
important matters. For instance, Wurman suggests that, by capping
the 1790 borrowing and tax power, Congress left only minor matters
to executive discretion, 349 and he justifies other early delegations on
similar grounds. 350 One could say the same about the Remission Act—
Congress set the upper limit on penalties, and set forth a (very general)
standard for determining who qualified for remission. Perhaps the
Treasury Secretary’s discretion to decide what penalty to impose on
lawbreakers was simply an unimportant detail that could
constitutionally be left to the executive branch. 351
Such arguments, however, only put us back to square one: How
do we distinguish between important matters Congress must decide
and unimportant details it can delegate? Maybe proponents of this
theory will flesh it out in ways that render it judicially administrable.
As an originalist matter, however, the absence of historical evidence in
its favor offers no good reason for the Supreme Court to abandon its
longstanding “intelligible principle” test in favor of an equally elusive
approach to delegation.
4. Necessity
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349 See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1542–56.
350 See, e.g., id. at 1533–34 (pensions); id. at 1542–43 (naturalization); id. at 1548–49
(patents).
351 But see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2143 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing SORNA’s similar delegation on the ground that Congress left all the
“policy decision[s]” to an executive branch officer).
352 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). But
see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 173 (1993) (the supposed necessity of a particular
delegation does not excuse a constitutional violation).
353 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
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Finally, there is the possibility of necessity: Congress had to
delegate certain functions—including remission—to the executive,
because it could not feasibly perform those tasks itself. Again, the
theory is plausible. It would be absurdly self-defeating to prohibit
Congress from delegating essential tasks it cannot itself perform, and
we know the Constitution is not “a suicide pact.” 352 Indeed, the Court’s
historically permissive approach to delegation has been shaped by a
recognition that any limit on Congress’s power to delegate must take
into account “common sense and the inherent necessities of the
governmental co-ordination.” 353 As the Court explained in Mistretta v.
United States, “in our increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply
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cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives.” 354
“Necessity” as the touchstone of delegation might make intuitive
sense, but as a distinction between permissible and impermissible
delegations it suffers from the same problems as an “important
subjects” theory. First, there is little evidence members of the
Founding generation framed delegation in these terms. It certainly
was not present in debates over the Remission Act. While members of
Congress generally agreed that the remission power itself was essential,
no one argued that Congress had to delegate that power to the executive
branch. 355
There is similarly little evidence that “necessity” was a core
concept in Founding-era views about delegation more generally. Gary
Lawson and Christine Chabot both rely on a 1791 comment by James
Madison suggesting that departures from nondelegation orthodoxy
might be justified on such grounds. 356 But others in the same debate
rejected the idea, 357 and it appears that arguments from necessity
otherwise did not appear in Founding-era discussions. Ilan Wurman
suggests in passing that several early delegations were constitutionally
permissible because “[i]t is difficult to imagine what more Congress
could have been expected to do.” 358 But Wurman does not embrace
“necessity” as a defining characteristic of an original nondelegation
principle, let alone offer evidence that it was. As a result, any originalist
effort to replace the Court’s longstanding “intelligible principle” test
with a more stringent “necessity” argument would seem to fail, at
minimum, for lack of proof. 359
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354 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105
(1946) (“Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and
impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules . . . .”).
355 See supra Section II.A.
356 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 238–39 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison) (“[T]here did
not appear to be any necessity for alienating the powers of the House; and that if this should
take place, it would be a violation of the Constitution.”); Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript
at 43–45) (extrapolating a “necessity” test for delegation from Madison’s statement);
Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript at 35–37) (similar).
357 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 239 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick) (“[A] supposed
necessity could not justify the infraction of a Constitution which the members were under
every obligation of duty, and their oaths, solemnly pledged, to support.”).
358 Wurman, supra note 8, at 1542; see also id. at 1544, 1545.
359 To be clear, neither Chabot nor Lawson argue that a “necessity” standard would
tighten the “intelligible principle” test, let alone replace it. For Chabot, the two principles
are entirely consistent, given the Court’s repeated reference to necessity concerns in
reaffirming its longstanding test. See Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript at 45–46). For
Lawson, arguments about necessity—which he believes are consistent with an original
fiduciary understanding of the Constitution—simply collapse into first-order disputes over
what tasks Congress should undertake in the first place. See Lawson, supra note 8
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Second, a “necessity” standard for delegation raises the same
subjectivity problems that flow from an “important subjects” theory.
The Remission Act again offers a telling example. Congress certainly
had the ability to handle remission petitions itself; it did so both before
the Act’s passage and after, 360 and did the same with thousands more
petitions on other subjects. 361 Yet as I discuss below, Congress may
have delegated the remission power to the Treasury Secretary because
doing so would free the legislature to focus on other matters. 362 To
determine whether it was “necessary” for Congress to delegate the
remission power, therefore, we first have to form a more general
opinion about how the early Congress should have spent its limited
time. 363 Thus even if a “necessity” exception to nondelegation was
historically justified (and it is not), it offers little help in distinguishing
permissible from impermissible delegations.
*

*

*

In the end, none of the various distinctions nondelegationists
have proposed can explain a number of early grants of power to the
executive branch—including the Remission Act. The most sensible
conclusion is that the robust limits on delegation that
nondelegationists believe inhered in the Constitution simply did not
exist.
IV.

DELEGATION AND IMPROVISATION AT THE FOUNDING
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(manuscript at 37–39) (“If Congress’s ‘job’ is indeed to micro-manage the entirety of
American society, there is at least a serious argument that massive subdelegation can be
justified by even a strict Madisonian understanding of necessity.”); cf. HAMBURGER, supra
note 9, at 420–22 (in the modern administrative state, alleged “necessity” is a constant
condition).
360 See supra Part II.
361 See McKinley, supra note 153, at 1573–74, 1590.
362 See infra Section IV.A.
363 See Lawson, supra note 8 (manuscript at 39) (the “necessity” argument the Court
makes in Mistretta presumes that Congress’s “‘job’ . . . involve[s] . . . a massive overseeing of
everybody’s lives, fortunes, and sacred honors” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 372 (1989))).
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If the record of early federal legislation points to a permissive view
of delegation at the Founding, a question remains: Why did Congress
repeatedly delegate broad authority to the executive branch? The
answer may not matter much for arguments over the original
understanding of Congress’s power to delegate. In evidentiary terms,
what counts most is the delegations themselves, and what they tell us
about what the Founding generation thought about constitutional
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A. Delegating to the Executive
So why did Congress give its authority to remit customs penalties
to the Treasury Secretary? Though the evidence is circumstantial, the
historical records reveal several possibilities.
One is that Congress valued the consistency that executive
resolution offered. Recall that, under the original House proposal, the
Remission Act would have assigned authority to local federal officials,
including district judges. But later versions of the bill shifted authority
to the executive branch, first to a three-member panel of cabinet
officers, and then to the Treasury Secretary alone. 364 This change met
objections; several members of Congress were concerned that

12/21/2021 11:58:47
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limits (or lack thereof) on Congress’s ability to give legislative power
to the executive.
That said, there is value in stepping back and considering more
broadly why Congress structured powers like remission the way it did.
Unearthing legislative motivations can help us make sense of the fact
that the Founding generation routinely tolerated broad delegations of
legislative authority under a Constitution predicated on separation of
powers.
The simple—if perhaps inelegant—answer is that granting broad
policymaking discretion to the executive branch was often the leastworst way to balance competing legislative priorities. As Part IV.A
shows, the Remission Act offers a telling example. After considering
and debating a number of different institutional mechanisms through
which the federal government could moderate the potentially harsh
effects of customs-related penalties, Congress settled on broad
discretion vested in the Treasury Secretary. Not because that was
obviously the correct choice—or the constitutionally most acceptable
one—but because it was the best among imperfect options.
More important, the architects of the early federal government
debated the possibilities largely in the language of governmental
efficiency, not constitutional limitation. As Part IV.B discusses, this was
a pattern repeated across the domains of federal authority, as the early
Congress struggled to devise new solutions to the myriad problems of
national governance. Indeed, attending to this period’s administrative
dynamism helps make sense of two additional examples of delegation
that figure prominently in the originalist literature. Whatever
nondelegation principle members of the Founding generation may
have thought inhered in the Constitution, it did not appear to shape
their choices about how to design a functional administrative system.

See supra Section II.B.
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centralized decisionmaking would slow the delivery of warranted relief,
and disadvantage petitioners located far from the seat of
government. 365 Yet Congress apparently concluded that the “strict
justice” 366 that a single decision maker would provide would “more
effectually . . . secure the revenue.”367
Indeed, Fisher Ames, the Act’s chief proponent, doubted whether
Congress was equal to the task of ruling on remission petitions
consistently. In responding to Edward Livingston’s argument that
Congress could not constitutionally delegate the remission power,
Ames questioned whether a “popular body” could produce “anything
like system” in this area. 368 He may have had good reasons for his
doubts. The House’s procedural mechanisms for responding to
petitions might have enabled it to rule consistently with past
decisions. 369 But any action in favor of a petitioner through private bill
was subject to approval by the entire legislature. 370 The Secretary also
had an expertise advantage. As one representative argued very early
in the debates, the Secretary’s “general superintendence” 371 over the
customs system meant that he was best-positioned to “establish a
uniform rule” regarding remission. 372 As discussed earlier, it appears
that the early Secretaries in fact did exercise their power in predictable
and consistent ways. 373
A second possibility is neutrality. Ames, in particular, worried that
legislative politics would have a distorting effect on remission
decisions. In his view, it would be impossible for Congress to decide
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365 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (1790) (statement of Rep. Goodhue) (petitioners far
from the national capital would suffer from delay); Thomas Lloyd, Lloyd’s Notes, 24 March
1790 (Mar. 24, 1790) (shorthand notes) (statement of Rep. Sherman), in 12 DHFFC, supra
note 148, at 845 (“The amendment made by the Senate will cause some delays.”); id. at 846
(statement of Rep. Jackson) (“The people who [are] referred to the Secretary of the
Treasury [will be] dragged over to New York to be tried.”); id. (statement of Rep. Smith)
(“The distant inhabitants will lose all possible relief. This amendment seems calculated for
the (merchants) of this city.”); id. at 847 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (saying remission
“[o]ught to be determined in the state where [the offense] happens”).
366 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1474 (1790) (statement of Rep. Sherman); see also 6 ANNALS
OF CONG. 2286 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames) (rejecting option of making customs laws
“loosely,” and giving “considerable discretion” to front-line officers in execution). This
accords with broader concerns that Hamilton and others had about giving front-line
officers discretion in customs collection generally. See RAO, supra note 113, at 49–99.
367 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1474 (1790) (statement of Rep. Sherman).
368 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames).
369 See McKinley, supra note 153, at 1561–62 (discussing regularized House procedures
for responding to petitions, including standing committees for particular subject areas).
370 Id. at 1549 n.34.
371 Thomas Lloyd, 11 January 1790, 3 CONG. REG., Jan. 28, 1790 (statement of Rep.
Laurance), as reprinted in 12 DHFFC, supra note 148, at 10, 11.
372 Id. at 10–11 (statement of Rep. Boudinot).
373 See supra subsection III.A.1.
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374 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames).
375 See id. at 2288 (statement of Rep. Ames) (“[I]f one of his constituents were to come
to him and request relief, he should find himself necessarily interested in his behalf.”)
376 Id.
377 Id. at 2286 (statement of Rep. Ames).
378 See id. (delegating the remission power to “Executive officers” would prevent the
influence of “local sympathy” from affecting decisions).
379 Id. at 2288 (statement of Rep. Ames).
380 Id. at 2285 (statement of Rep. Sitgreaves).
381 See id. at 2289 (statement of Rep. Livingston) (“[I]t was certainly more difficult to
influence several men than one man.”).
382 Saddler Report, supra note 99.
383 Lloyd, supra note 371, at 10–11 (statement of Rep. Boudinot).
384 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (1797) (statement of Rep. Livingston); see also id.
(statement of Rep. Sitgreaves) (noting that the 1797 Act extended the Treasury Secretary’s
remission power to violations of statutory requirements regarding vessel licensing and
registration was because “the time of the House had been considerably occupied by
petitions for remissions of forfeitures”)
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on petitions free of the influence of “local sympathy.” 374 Every
representative would feel obliged to advocate on behalf of constituents
seeking relief, 375 which would “dirty their fingers” 376 and produce
unfortunate “precedent[s]” that subsequent petitioners could invoke
to support their suspect claims. 377 In contrast, Ames thought executive
branch officers were insulated from political pressure. 378 They owed
“responsibility” to Congress—and the nation—as a whole, a fact that
would help ensure “proper conduct” in using the remission power. 379
Or as another representative asserted, the Treasury Secretary was
“naturally . . . bias[ed]” in favor of augmenting federal revenue, so
there was “no danger” to the national interest in placing the remission
power in his hands. 380 Not everyone agreed—Edward Livingston
thought that a single decisionmaker would be more likely to be
improperly influenced by wealthy and powerful merchants seeking to
use the system to their advantage. 381 But at minimum it seems that the
promise of administrative neutrality may have encouraged Congress to
delegate remission to the Treasury Secretary.
There is also a third, more prosaic explanation for why Congress
delegated the remission power. It wanted to relieve itself of the burden
of responding to petitions. Hamilton suggested as much in his 1790
proposal: vesting remission authority outside Congress would avoid the
“inconvenience of a Legislative Decision” on individual
applications. 382 At least one member of Congress agreed; if the House
did not divert petitions somewhere else, it would be “consumed in
local concerns,” unable to focus on “promoting the public good.”383
The problem remained in 1797; Congress had to expand the
Secretary’s power to rid the House of petitions that continued to
“engage [its] attention every session.” 384 As one representative bluntly
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385 Id. at 1789 (unattributed).
386 Id. at 2287 (statement of Rep. Coit).
387 See supra Section II.C.
388 For example, an early version of a 1791 Act regulating distilled spirits provided for
remission of penalties by the district court judge, with an appeal to the Supreme Court
available in cases worth $500 or more. Enclosure: [An Act Repealing Duties Laid Upon Distilled
Spirits Imported], [9 January 1790], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jan. 9, 1790), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-06-020076-0002-0013 [https://perma.cc/5FXC-KYAP]. The final version of the Act gave
remission authority to the Treasury Secretary. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 43, 1 Stat. 199,
209. And in the 1797 debates over the Remission Act’s reauthorization, several members
revived the proposal from 1790 for vesting the power in a multi-member board. See 6
ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (1797) (statement of Rep. Swanwick); id. (statement of Rep. Coit);
id. (statement of Rep. Livingston).
389 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2291 (1797) (statement of Rep. Coit).
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warned, if legislators were obliged to dispose of such petitions
themselves, “they might sit the whole year round about subjects worse
than nothing.”385
In the end, the best answer to the question of why Congress
delegated such broad authority to the Treasury Secretary might be “all
of the above.” That is, there was no single reason for the decision;
representatives who supported the Remission Act did so for a variety
of reasons. Nor was delegation to the Secretary the obvious choice.
Each of the possible configurations of the remission power involved
tradeoffs among important values: consistency, expertise, neutrality,
capacity. Granting authority to the Treasury Secretary was simply the
best—or least-worst—of several imperfect solutions.
As one
representative put it, the legislature delegated the remission power to
the Secretary in 1790 because “[n]o better mode could then be
thought of.” 386
Reflecting this administrative ambivalence, Congress initially
made the Act temporary, and did not make it permanent for another
decade. 387 It considered other configurations in the meantime. 388
Little wonder that, when critics in 1797 fretted about the danger of
concentrating so much power in one person’s hands, one defender
responded with a rhetorical shrug: however “extraordinary” the
remission power was, the Secretary had been exercising it for years,
and “no material inconvenience had arisen.”389 In other words, what
cemented executive-branch remission into the permanent
architecture of federal law enforcement was not a grand theory about
the relative domains of legislative and executive authority. It was the
simple fact that the Act worked well enough.
Critically, members of Congress did not think that the
Constitution meaningfully constrained their choice of institutional
arrangement. As discussed earlier, opponents of the Remission Act
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made only a handful of half-hearted arguments that it was
unconstitutional, and just one based on nondelegation principles. 390
Congress apparently felt free to propose and debate delegations to
different actors in nonconstitutional terms. It adopted an approach
modeled on British practice. This, despite the fact that, according to
nondelegationists, the Founding generation’s alleged distrust of
delegation was a reaction against the British constitution’s tradition of
parliamentary supremacy over the constitution. 391
Remission’s improvisational foundations become even more
evident when viewed within the broader framework of the customs laws
more generally. Much of the legislation Congress wrote in this area
was highly detailed, specifying everything from the precise duties on
rum, steel, and salt 392 to the size of the containers in which beer and
wine could be imported into the United States. 393 According to
Jennifer Mascott, members of the First Congress believed that, at least
with respect to duties on goods, legislative specificity helped ensure
that the customs laws balanced conflicting state and regional economic
concerns through the mechanism of representative politics.394
At the same time, Congress left critical aspects of this regulatory
regime largely to executive discretion 395—including the Remission
Act’s authority to effectively rewrite the statutory penalties for customs
violations. In other words, legislative specificity and executive discretion were not constitutionally irreconcilable modes of governance.
They were simply different tools the early Congress reached for in
order to meet the immediate challenges at hand.
B. Improvising Administration
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390 See supra Sections II.B–C.
391 See, e.g., Wurman, supra note 8, at 1527–31.
392 See Mascott, supra note 63, at 1415–27.
393 See, e.g., Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 27, § 12, 1 Stat. 259, 262 (prohibiting importation
of beer, ale, or porter in casks smaller than forty gallons or in packages of fewer than six
dozen bottles); see also MASHAW, supra note 85, at 44 (observing the 1791 Spirits Act
specified “everything from the brand of hydrometer to be used in testing proof to the exact
lettering to be used on casks that have been inspected”).
394 See Mascott, supra note 63, at 1395.
395 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 346 (describing how Congress passed
statutes governing customs enforcement without “any meaningful guidance about the
circumstances in which ships ought to be searched or the type of evidence that ought to
make collectors think that fraud or smuggling was afoot”).
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Congress’s early willingness to experiment with administrative
regimes becomes even more evident when we look across the domains
of federal authority. Consider the episode that nondelegationists cite
as powerful evidence of a demanding Founding-era doctrine: the 1792
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statute establishing the national postal system. 396 During debate over
the legislation, Theodore Sedgwick proposed giving the President
complete discretion to designate the roads on which the mail would
travel. 397 Echoing themes that had arisen in the Remission Act debates
two years earlier, Sedgwick asserted that the President had better
information about the mails than Congress, and his decisions would
not be “biassed [sic] by local interests.” 398 The proposal’s opponents
doubted both propositions: collectively, Congress knew more about
local conditions, 399 and granting authority to the President would give
him a “dangerous power” he could use to his personal advantage.400
Several opponents also asserted that such a delegation would be
unconstitutional, 401 and Congress rejected Sedgwick’s proposal.402 In
the statute’s final version, Congress specified the post roads in
excruciating detail. 403 Accordingly, a number of nondelegationists cite
this episode as powerful evidence of a robust Founding-era doctrine. 404
Yet as scholars have pointed out, 405 in the very same statute Congress
gave the executive branch discretion to extend the post roads and to
decide where post offices would be located. 406
The mystery is why Congress rejected a grant of executive
discretion as to one part of the postal system but embraced as to other
parts. The Constitution gives Congress the power to establish “Post
Offices” and “post Roads,” 407 so a partial limitation on delegation is
textually unjustifiable. 408 A better explanation is that apportioning
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396 See POSTELL, supra note 320, at 75–77; Gordon, supra note 8, at 744–47; Lawson,
supra note 14, at 402–03; Wurman, supra note 8, at 1506–12.
397 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick) (proposing post
roads would be determined “by such route as the President of the United States shall, from
time to time, cause to be established”).
398 Id.
399 See id. at 233 (statement of Rep. White) (“No individual could possess an equal
share of information with th[e] House on the subject of the geography of the United
States.”).
400 Id. at 235 (statement of Rep. Vining).
401 See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1507–08 (citing statements).
402 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 241 (1791).
403 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232, 232–33.
404 See sources cited supra note 396.
405 See Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript at 43–44 & n.380); Mortenson & Bagley, supra
note 7, at 353–54.
406 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 232, 233 (saying Postmaster General can
enter into contracts “for extending the line of posts”); id. § 3 (saying Postmaster General
has authority to appoint deputy postmasters “at all places where such shall be found
necessary”).
407 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
408 Indeed, one opponent of Sedwick’s proposal argued that, in light of Article I,
section 8, Congress had a “duty” to “designate the roads” and “to establish the offices.” 3
ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (statement of Rep. Livermore). Wurman explains the
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decision-making authority in this manner was simply the best way to
satisfy competing interests and concerns.
Communities near
designated post roads reaped significant economic advantages, so
representatives in the House may have been eager to specify by statute
that the roads would run in their districts. 409 But members of Congress
likely had less enthusiasm for making adjustments to the routes going
forward, a task that—like addressing remission petitions—would
require constant legislative attention. 410 Congress therefore left it to
the executive branch to “extend[]” the system as it saw fit. 411 In the
end, as with the customs regime, a mix of legislative specification and
executive discretion may have best accommodated the various interests
at play.
Or take another example: the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793.
Within weeks of convening, the First Congress received petitions from
inventors seeking private legislation confirming their intellectual
property rights—something state legislatures had traditionally done. 412
Concerned about the volume of work involved, Congress immediately
sought to allocate responsibility elsewhere. 413 It considered a number
of different arrangements, including juries and private referees.414 As
commentators have noted, Congress ultimately gave authority to a
panel of executive branch officers to grant patents to any invention
they deemed “sufficiently useful [or] important.” 415
Even
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discrepancy by arguing that the delegations of authority to extend the post roads and site
post offices were “less significant,” because “[t]he important question of the day” was the
designation of the initial roads. Wurman, supra note 8, at 1510–11. But Wurman’s
argument is premised primarily on his own view of the relative importance of each
component of the statutory scheme. See id. (“[T]he President’s discretion was greatly
cabined once Congress had established the locations of the post roads.”).
409 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 241 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick) (noting that
opponents of executive discretion “had a very important interest in establishing the
directions of the post”); CURRIE, supra note 306, at 149 (“[O]ne is tempted to attribute the
House’s zest for detail more to a taste for pork than to a principled concern for the virtues
of representative government.”).
410 See MASHAW, supra note 85, at 46 (describing how Congress was concerned that it
would be inundated with “demands for the expansion of the postal service”); Chabot, supra
note 8 (manuscript at 45) (“Delegation to the executive was necessary to incorporate these
important adjustments to existing post routes.”).
411 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792 § 2.
412 See McKinley, supra note 153, at 1563–65.
413 See id. at 1565.
414 See Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript at 36–37).
415 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (saying patent will issue on the vote
of two of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General); see Chabot, supra
note 8 (manuscript at 36–39); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 1735.
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nondelegationists admit that this was a broad grant of discretion in an
area of significant economic importance. 416
Congress revised the Patent Act in 1793. Among other changes,
executive officers no longer had the discretion to approve or deny a
patent on “useful or important” grounds. Instead, the Secretary of
State and Attorney General had no discretion; they were to grant a
patent in response to any application that met the statute’s technical
requirements. 417 Rival inventors could then challenge issued patents
in court on various grounds. 418 This change left the judiciary, rather
than the executive, as the institution ultimately responsible for
determining which inventions would receive protection.
Congress did not make this change out of concern that the 1790
Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the executive
branch, as Aaron Gordon suggests. 419 As recalled twenty years later by
Thomas Jefferson (the 1793 Act’s prime mover 420), the institutional
rearrangement was a matter of efficiency. Under the 1790 Act, the
executive board developed a few general rules in determining whether
to grant patents, but an “abundance of cases” fell outside the scope of
those rules. 421 Deciding fact-specific cases took time—more time than
cabinet officers could “spare from higher duties.” 422 So the 1793 Act
turned responsibility “over to the judiciary,” to allow the patentgranting process “to be matured into a system” that would enable
inventors to know their rights. 423
Importantly, Jefferson did not think (at least in hindsight) that
this was actually the best way to award patents. Judges’ educations left
them ill-prepared to decide questions of scientific merit, and inventors
would therefore find little guidance in “the lubberly volumes of the
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416 See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1548 (acknowledging the Patent Act “leaves a lot of
discretion” to the executive branch).
417 See Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21; The Patent Act of 1793, 18 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y (CENTENNIAL NUMBER ISSUE) 77, 81 (1936) (claiming the 1793 Act “made
the grant of a patent purely a clerical matter”).
418 See Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE (Thomas Jefferson) (Aug. 13, 1813), https://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Jefferson/03-06-02-0322 [https://perma.cc/8C2V-NKTP] (“[I]nstead of refusing a patent
in the first instance, as the [executive] board was authorised to do, the patent now issues of
course, subject to be declared void on such principles as should be established by the courts
of law.”).
419 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 796–97.
420 See Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript at 40); A Bill to Promote the Progress of the Useful
Arts, [1 December 1791], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Thomas Jefferson) (Dec. 1,
1791),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-22-02-0322
[https://
perma.cc/TX3H-YMHZ].
421 Thomas Jefferson, supra note 418.
422 Id.
423 Id.
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law.” 424 Jefferson would have preferred leaving the matter to a board
of “Academical professors” instead. 425 But a proposal to create a
separate department to handle patents was roundly opposed in
Congress in 1793. 426 And because England had adopted the judicial
model, “the usual predominancy of her examples,” according to
Jefferson, led to a similar arrangement in the United States. 427
The parallels between the Patent and Remission Acts are
revealing. In both, Congress sought to divest itself of legislative
authority to decide important questions impacting the rights of private
individuals. 428 It considered delegating its power to several different
configurations of judicial and executive branch officials. It ultimately
settled on an arrangement that offered administrative advantages, but
was not inherently the right choice. Indeed, it may have largely been
a reflexive retreat to familiar models derived from British practice.
And all the while, few constitutional objections (if any) emerged.
These are just a few of many examples of Congress’s early
experimentation in arranging institutional decisionmaking, many of
which involved broad delegations of discretionary authority. 429 It did
the same with military pensions, 430 the governance of federal
territories, 431 and management of the national debt. 432 Indeed, as
historians have recently demonstrated, this kind of administrative
creativity extended across the many domains of federal governance, in
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424 Id.
425 Id.
426 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 855 (1793) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (objecting to any
proposal “which should provide for the institution of a new department”); id. (statement
of Rep. Williamson) (“He was decidedly opposed to creating a new Department . . . .”).
427 Thomas Jefferson, supra note 418; see also 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 855 (1793) (statement
of Rep. Williamson) (asserting that the 1793 Act “was an imitation of the Patent System of
Great Britain”).
428 On patents as private rights, see supra note 330.
429 See MASHAW, supra note 85, at 34–50.
430 See McKinley, supra note 153, at 1586–89 (describing early congressional efforts to
enlist the executive and judiciary branches in resolving pension claims).
431 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 334–38 (describing discretion granted to
executive branch officials in administering the Northwest Territory and the District of
Columbia).
432 See Chabot, supra note 8 (manuscript at 31–33) (detailing discretion given to the
Sinking Fund Commission, composed of executive and judicial officers).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 160 Side B



43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 161 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B$5/<&.BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2021]

30

DELEGATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND IMPROVISATION

311

areas as diverse as revenue collection, 433 military development, 434
disaster relief, 435 land sales, 436 and public subsidies 437 (among others).
This improvisation—and uncertainty—extended not just to the
allocation of powers, but also to the assignment of personnel. The
early federal government was deeply understaffed, 438 and the early
Congress routinely sought to enlist various federal and state officers to
fulfill multiple government functions 439 (as did the executive
branch 440). At times these efforts prompted constitutional objections,
but not on delegation grounds. Famously, in Hayburn’s Case the
Justices of the Supreme Court raised constitutional doubts about their
role in deciding who was eligible for Revolutionary War pensions,
because the statutory scheme effectively allowed Congress and the
Secretary of War to overrule their decisions.441 In response, Congress
created a new scheme in which judges only took evidence and
transmitted it to the Secretary 442—a role remarkably similar to the one
Congress had earlier assigned to federal judges under the Remission
Act. 443 Even though assignment of these considerable administrative
duties apparently rankled some judges, no constitutional complaints
arose again. 444
To be sure, the possibility that there was some original
constitutional limit on Congress’s ability to delegate its powers is not
preposterous. As this Article (and others) have demonstrated,
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433 See RAO, supra note 113.
434 See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003); MAX M. EDLING, A
HERCULES IN THE CRADLE: WAR, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1783–1867 (2014).
435 See DAUBER, supra note 153.
436 See GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND: GOVERNING PROPERTY AND VIOLENCE IN
THE FIRST U.S. TERRITORIES (2021); PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE
ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL EXPANSION (2017).
437 See BALOGH, supra note 313; RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE
AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE (1995).
438 See RAO, supra note 113, at 69.
439 See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104,
1161–65 (2013) (describing early federal statutes imposing “administrative burdens” on
state officials).
440 See Kevin Arlyck, The Courts and Foreign Affairs at the Founding, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1,
35 (describing Washington Administration efforts to enlist federal and state officers in
preventing French maritime attacks on British vessels).
441 See Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 527, 530.
442 Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 324, 324–25.
443 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122–23.
444 See James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the
Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2008) (quoting 1800 statement from district court
judge that remission petitions “add much to the increase of business to the judges, in
matters too, not strictly within the line of their Judicial functions”).
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nondelegation arguments popped up occasionally in early legislative
debates, and it seems unlikely that sophisticated skeptics of executive
power (like James Madison) would bother with arguments that could
not pass the laugh test. But whatever constitutional principle Madison
and others had in mind, it clearly did not have much purchase. Across
the federal government, Congress made decisions about where it
should locate decision-making authority not by reference to
immovable principles of constitutional law, but through the rough and
tumble of legislative politics.
Indeed, according to Hamilton, that was the way it should be.
When he first proposed that Congress vest its remission authority
“somewhere,” Hamilton indicated that the legislature could “safe[l]y”
delegate that power to another entity, but he did not specify to
whom. 445 A question of such “delicacy and importance,” according to
Hamilton, would best be answered after “mature deliberation” by
Congress. 446 In the end, the choice of whether—and where—to
delegate legislative authority was left to the legislature itself.
CONCLUSION
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445 Saddler Report, supra note 99.
446 Id. Wurman suggests Hamilton’s reference to the “delicacy and importance” of the
question of where to locate the remission power is support for an “important subjects”
theory of nondelegation. See Wurman, supra note 8, at 1553 n.348 (quoting Saddler Report,
supra note 99). But nondelegation would be a “craven watchdog indeed” if the only
“important subject” the Constitution requires Congress to decide is which administrative
agency should exercise legislative power. Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 266 (2010) (“[T]he presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven
watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in
the case.”).
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On its own, the Remission Act may not defeat originalist
arguments in favor of a restrictive version of the nondelegation
doctrine. The Act is just one instance of early federal legislation
granting the executive branch broad discretion to fashion rules
governing private conduct. And it is an odd one, at that. The Treasury
Secretary did not formally make prospective rules; he altered or
dispensed with Congress’s statutory directives as he saw fit, even if he
did so consistently and predictably. The Secretary exercised discretion
that was greater than—but akin to—law-enforcement authority we
conventionally understand executive branch officials to enjoy. As the
Remission Act’s chief congressional defender, Fisher Ames, suggested,
perhaps remission as a form of constitutional authority was neither fish
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nor fowl. 447 And perhaps remission’s defiance of easy categorization is
what made its delegation constitutionally palatable.
Remission’s peculiarity may be a plausible explanation for the
Act’s passage and persistence, but it is not the best one. Even if
couched in unusual form, the power Congress granted to the Treasury
Secretary in 1790 was unmistakably broad and fundamentally
legislative. That is likely why no one in Congress bothered to defend
the Act’s constitutionality on the ground of exceptionality. Nor was
the Act the only such delegation the early Congress made. As this
Article shows, it is similarly difficult to explain away other examples
through distinctions no one at the Founding made, and likely would
have rejected. If there was a Founding-era consensus that the
Constitution incorporated a nondelegation principle, apparently it did
not meaningfully limit Congress’s ability to give away its power.
The difficulty of pigeonholing the Remission Act highlights a
broader point, as well. In this and many other areas, the early
Congresses often showed little interest in articulating a careful
taxonomy of offices and powers. When it came to designing an
efficient and responsive system of federal governance, the Founding
generation did not traffic much in constitutional absolutes. That, of
course, is a challenge for judges and scholars who seek to ground
definitive statements of constitutional principle in historical
evidence. 448 If nothing else, it suggests that the search for a “useable
past” 449 by those who advocate for a more stringent version of the
nondelegation doctrine may be unproductive.
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447 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (1797) (statement of Rep. Ames) (remission was “neither
Judicial nor Legislative” power).
448 Compare Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 7, at 367 (“There was no nondelegation
doctrine at the Founding, and the question isn’t close.”), with Gundy v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (finding the Court’s current “intelligible
principle” test “has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution [or] in history”),
and Wurman, supra note 8, at 1494 (“[T]here is significant evidence that the Founding
generation adhered to a nondelegation doctrine . . . .”).
449 Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601 passim (1995).
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